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335 
A Fresh Start to Bankruptcy Exemptions 
Gary E. Sullivan* 
Bankruptcy has broadly failed to deliver “fresh starts” to debtors. 
Too often, debtors return to states of financial distress following bank-
ruptcy. Although bankruptcy delivers a clean slate through the discharge 
of debts, the efficacy of a fresh start depends on a second factor: property 
exemptions. While discharge frees a debtor from her existing debts, 
property exemptions determine what property the debtor retains upon 
exiting bankruptcy. For many debtors, insufficient and suboptimal prop-
erty exemption laws undermine fresh starts. In fact, under current bank-
ruptcy law, each state can reject federal bankruptcy exemptions by 
opting out. Bankrupt debtors in “opt-out” states are forced to rely on 
general state exemptions—often stingy and focused on preserving home-
steads—that were not designed for bankruptcy. 
Existing literature explores two lines of criticism against the federal 
opt-out provision: (1) arguing that the law should be struck down as 
repugnant to constitutional notions of uniformity, supremacy, or both, 
and (2) making the case for repeal on normative and fairness grounds. 
For decades, neither solution has been forthcoming. The opt-out scheme, 
at first aberrant and controversial, has proved a perdurable feature of 
bankruptcy law. 
This Article advances a different approach and proposes diffusive, 
state-based reform solutions. Under this approach, each opt-out state 
would undertake a meaningful review of its existing exemptions regime 
in light of the federally declared rehabilitative function of bankruptcy. I 
propose a model, to be used in this review, involving three factors—
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housing agnosticism, nominal sufficiency, and allocative flexibility—as a 
conceptual framework for reforms. Addressing constitutional concerns, 
this Article argues that these innovative “bankruptcy-specific exemp-
tions” schemes should survive constitutional scrutiny. The Article ends 
with discussion of the model and proposed reform framework. 
CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 337 
I. EXEMPTIONS AND BANKRUPTCY .................................................................. 340 
A. Divergent Purposes .............................................................................. 341 
B. States Without Power to Grant Fresh Starts ........................................ 345 
C. Exemptions in Bankruptcy ................................................................... 347 
1. Historical synopsis of exemptions in bankruptcy: The first 
four acts, 1800 to 1898 ................................................................ 347 
2. The (optional) federal exemptions of the 1978 Code ................... 348 
II. LANDSCAPE OF EXEMPTIONS IN STATES ...................................................... 356 
A. General, Bankruptcy-Neutral State Exemptions ................................. 357 
B. State Bankruptcy-Specific Exemption Schemes ................................... 358 
III. STATE BANKRUPTCY-SPECIFIC EXEMPTION SCHEMES 
ARE CONSTITUTIONAL ....................................................................... 360 
A. Prevailing “Permissive” Conception of Uniformity ........................... 360 
1. Doctrine of geographical uniformity............................................ 361 
2. Limits of permissive uniformity: discriminatory regionalism 
through “private laws” .............................................................. 369 
B. State Bankruptcy-Specific Exemptions Are 
Constitutionally “Uniform” ............................................................. 371 
C. State Bankruptcy-Specific Exemptions Are Not Preempted Under 
the Supremacy Clause ...................................................................... 374 
1. The genesis of preemption is state interference with the 
purpose and objectives of bankruptcy law ............................... 375 
2. State bankruptcy-specific exemptions further, rather than 
interfere or conflict with, the purposes and objectives of 
bankruptcy law .......................................................................... 382 
IV. A MODEL FOR STATE BANKRUPTCY EXEMPTIONS REFORM .......................... 384 
A. The Model ............................................................................................. 385 
1. Justification .................................................................................... 387 
2. Structuring reforms ....................................................................... 388 
B. Parting Thoughts on the Political Calculus of Reforms ...................... 395 
02.SULLIVAN_FIN_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/7/18  10:02 AM 
335 A Fresh Start to Bankruptcy Exemptions 
 337 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 397 
APPENDIX A ................................................................................................. 398 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Exemptions play a prominent role in bankruptcy1 by deter-
mining what property a debtor can keep. Traditionally creatures 
of state law, exemptions prevent unsecured creditors from seizing 
or forcing the sale of a debtor’s property. In bankruptcy, 
exemptions operate in the same way by determining the types and 
amounts of property that can or cannot be sold by the trustee. In 
typical Chapter 7 cases, the trustee liquidates a debtor’s interest in 
unencumbered non-exempt assets.2 What is left over, the debt-
or retains. 
Property exemptions implicate a strong federal interest when 
a debtor files bankruptcy. That interest is the “fresh start.” The 
“fresh start” concept, now deeply entrenched in the bankruptcy 
psyche, was first discussed by the United States Supreme Court in 
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, where the Court emphasized the rehabili-
tative function of bankruptcy.3 Central to a “fresh start” is the 
discharge in bankruptcy, which frees a debtor’s future income 
 
 1. This Article explores exemption policies in the context of an individual filing 
liquidation bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
 2. Because exemptions cannot generally impair properly perfected security 
interests, only a debtor’s equity in assets is protected by an exemption. Stated another way, 
exemptions protect assets from seizure by unsecured creditors. A simple example is 
illustrative. Assume there are two debtors living in a jurisdiction providing a $5,000 
exemption for a motor vehicle. Each debtor owns a motor vehicle worth $7,500. Both 
debtors owe $10,000 in unsecured debt to Credit Card Corporation. Debtor A has no 
secured debt, while Debtor B has a single secured loan in the amount of $4,000 secured by a 
perfected security interest in his motor vehicle. Because exemptions protect a debtor’s 
equity, Credit Card Corporation (or, in bankruptcy, the Trustee as proxy for the unsecured 
creditors) can use the legal process to seize Debtor A’s car (equity of $7,500 exceed 
exemption of $5,000) while it cannot seize Debtor B’s car (equity of $7,500 minus $4,000 
equals $3,000, which is fully protected by the $5,000 exemption). 
 3. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (“[Bankruptcy] gives to the 
honest but unfortunate debtor who surrenders for distribution the property which he owns 
at the time of bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, 
unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.”). 
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from existing creditor claims. As noted by Professor Thomas 
Jackson, a discharge preserves a debtor’s “human capital.”4 
While discharge frees a debtor’s future income from existing 
creditor claims, the discharge alone does not define the “fresh 
start.” A related, and often coequal, component of the “fresh start” 
is property exemptions. What property should a debtor be entitled 
to keep to begin his post-bankruptcy trek toward rehabilitation? 
The answer to this question can determine the efficacy of the 
“fresh start.” A debtor freed from creditor claims but left in an 
abject state of balance sheet poverty faces higher hurdles to 
rehabilitation than a debtor left with substantial property. This 
difference is particularly acute when the types of property held by 
the latter debtor enable him to seek and sustain employment. 
Simply put, a discharged debtor with a car, computer, and appli-
cable “tools of the trade” is in a superior position to mount a 
“comeback” than a similarly situated discharged debtor retaining 
little to no property. While discharge enables a fresh start, exemp-
tions determine the location of the starting line in the debtor’s race 
toward rehabilitation following bankruptcy. 
Congress weighed in on where the starting line should be in 
1978. Following nearly a century of silence on the question of 
what specific exemptions should apply in bankruptcy,5 Congress 
passed a detailed set of federal bankruptcy exemptions in § 522(d) 
of the Bankruptcy Code. These federal exemptions were more 
generous to debtors than most state exemptions, and they 
included a so-called “wild card” exemption mechanism making 
them even more favorable to debtors.6 Categories of property 
 
 4. Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 
1393, 1396 (1985). “Our bankruptcy statutes have always taken ‘discharge’ to mean, 
essentially, that an individual’s human capital (as manifested in future earnings), as well as 
his future inheritances and gifts, are freed of liabilities he incurred in the past.” Id. 
 5. Under the bankruptcy law passed in the form of the 1898 Act, in effect from 1898 
until 1978, Congress completely delegated exemptions policy to the states by simply 
incorporating state exemptions into bankruptcy. See infra Section I.C.2. 
 6. In order to provide a debtor with a certain amount of flexibility with respect to 
claiming exemptions, the Bankruptcy Code contains a “wild card” exemption codified at 
§ 522(d)(5). 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5) (2012). This exemption is commonly referred to as a “wild 
card” exemption because it enables a debtor to essentially select any type of property to 
exempt up to $11,500, provided that the debtor has not used all of the homestead 
exemption contained in § 522(d)(1). Id. § 522(d)(1). See James C. Mordy, Brian H. Dunn & 
Melanie Mann Johnson, Constitutionality of “Opt-Out” Statutes Providing for Exemptions to 
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were included to protect certain dollar amounts in a debtor’s 
homestead, motor vehicles, household goods and furnishings, 
jewelry, and the like.7 
After clearly articulating its vision of the appropriate exemp-
tions level in bankruptcy, Congress undermined it by allowing 
states the right to “opt out” of the federal exemptions.8 The line 
was drawn, but Congress provided states with erasers. Predict-
ably, this odd “line plus erasers” structure was the result of a 
political compromise between the House and Senate.9 Since pas-
sage of the Code, exemptions are now determined under this 
concurrent system—federal exemptions apply in bankruptcy, 
unless the debtor’s state has opted out, in which case exemptions 
are determined by state law.10 Over two-thirds of states opted out 
of federal bankruptcy exemptions, leaving Congress’s determi-
nation of appropriate exemptions available to residents of only 
thirteen states. 
Following enactment of the Code, scholars and commentators 
leveled searing criticisms of the concurrent exemptions system in 
bankruptcy. Some attacked the constitutionality of the “opt out” 
provisions on the bases of the Bankruptcy Clause’s call for 
“uniform Laws,” the Supremacy Clause, or both. Prominent in 
these criticisms was the argument that debtors in “opt out” states 
 
Bankrupts, 48 MO. L. REV. 627, 630 (1983). The wild card exemption is applicable to any 
property the debtor has, and effectively allows the debtor to use any “unused” portion of 
the § 522(d)(1) homestead exemption. For example, if a debtor is unable to claim a 
homestead exemption under § 522(d)(1) because the debtor does not currently own a home, 
the debtor may apply the unused portion of that exemption to any property the debtor 
wishes to exempt. See WILLIAM HOUSTON BROWN, LAWRENCE R. AHERN, III & NANCY FRAAS 
MACLEAN, BANKRUPTCY EXEMPTION MANUAL § 5:6 (2012 ed.). “By utilizing the wild card 
provision, the non-homeowner, or the homeowner with minimal equity in his property, 
can avail himself of the homestead exemption by exempting valuable property to the extent 
of the unused portion of that exemption.” Mordy, supra, at 630. Essentially, the unused 
homestead exemption “spills over” to other property in order to make up for the debtor’s 
lack of ability to take advantage of the homestead exemption. Section 522(d)(5) may be 
applied to any property of the debtor and there is no limitation with regard to the type of 
property that may be exempt using this wild card exemption. Id. The main purpose of this 
wild card exemption, according to Congress, is to eliminate the prior discrimination against 
non-homeowner debtors. Id. 
 7. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d). 
 8. See id. § 522(b)(2). 
 9. See infra Section I.C.2. 
 10. Most non-opt out states retained their own exemption schemes, permitting a 
debtor filing bankruptcy to choose federal exemptions or state general exemptions. 
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were being deprived of the same “fresh start” afforded to debtors 
in states permitting federal exemptions. In terms of solutions to 
this problem, two primary arguments were advanced: (i) advo-
cating that the Court determine the opt-out provision unconsti-
tutional (thereby rendering the federal exemptions available in 
every bankruptcy case) or (ii) calling on Congress to amend § 522 
by removing the opt-out and imposing uniform federal exemp-
tions on all states. 
For over three decades since passage of the Code, neither 
solution has been forthcoming. The Court has shown no appetite 
for taking up arguments in favor of striking down the opt-out 
provision, and Congress has made no serious attempt to amend 
§ 522 by making federal exemptions mandatorily available 
in bankruptcy. 
This Article proposes a third solution: widespread state 
enactment and liberalization of exemptions specifically designed 
for debtors in bankruptcy. Using so-called bankruptcy-specific 
exemptions, states should provide tailored exemptions to flush 
the starting lines for debtor rehabilitation. This Article argues that 
each opt-out state should move toward providing a compre-
hensive set of exemptions for bankrupt debtors. The argument 
entails two fundamental points: (i) explaining how and why state 
bankruptcy-specific exemption schemes are constitutional under 
the Bankruptcy Clause and Supremacy Clause and (ii) proposing 
a conceptual model for state legislatures to follow in crafting 
reforms. The model includes three factors: eliminating or mini-
mizing discrimination against non-homeowners, providing no-
minally sufficient dollar amounts, and reducing the rigidity of 
property classifications to permit debtors to protect more types 
of property. 
I. EXEMPTIONS AND BANKRUPTCY 
My basic thesis: General state exemption schemes largely fail 
to serve the rehabilitative function11 of federal bankruptcy law 
 
 11. Ideally, an empirical study would be necessary to prove an actual causal 
relationship between the federal exemptions providing a more efficacious fresh start base 
than competing state exemptions providing less dollar amounts and less flexible categories. 
None has been published. To fill this gap, this Article relies on the premise that an 
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because they were designed for other purposes. This divergence 
in purposes is illustrated by examining the justifications for 
general state exemptions versus federal bankruptcy exemptions. 
Further support for this thesis is found in using the Contracts 
Clause as a lens through which to review the reasons states have 
general exemptions laws and the constitutional limits on states’ 
power to achieve debtor rehabilitation. 
A. Divergent Purposes 
A common critique of the existing concurrent exemptions 
scheme is that many state exemptions are “less generous”12 than 
the federal bankruptcy exemptions. Under general federalism 
principles, states can define property rights, including the 
contours of exemptions, as they see fit. Many states prefer 
generous homestead exemptions while others focus on protecting 
other asset classes such as retirement accounts, tax refunds, and 
the like. 
When a resident of a state files bankruptcy, however, an 
important federal interest is triggered. The rehabilitative function 
of bankruptcy, ensconced in the “fresh start,” arises. States 
choosing to veto federal exemptions leave bankrupt residents with 
existing bankruptcy-neutral state exemptions. Can these bank-
ruptcy-neutral exemptions play an appropriate role in delivering a 
fresh start? Do they? 
The divergent purposes of bankruptcy versus bankruptcy-
neutral exemptions provide powerful clues to the answer. 
 
exemption scheme that permits a debtor to retain higher dollar amounts of more congruent 
types of property provides a stronger fresh start foundation than one that does not. By way 
of example, for two similarly situated debtors who have unencumbered interests in a motor 
vehicle and tools of the trade, an exemption scheme providing protection of these interests 
puts the debtor in a superior position for future rehabilitation than the competing scheme 
that permits the bankruptcy trustee to repossess and sell these items. 
 12. This phrase, used in much of the literature, is oversimplified. Assume an 
exemption regime that allows a debtor to keep an aggregate amount of $35,000 among 
items of personal property such as household goods, motor vehicles, computer equipment, 
tools of the trade, etc. Compare that regime to a competing regime that provides zero 
exemptions for personal property but a homestead exemption of $40,000. The oft-used 
“generous” measure would label the former scheme as “less generous.” Perhaps it is. But 
with respect to the fresh start, the former is arguably more generous, as it protects types of 
assets which, retained, could enable a debtor to seek or advance employment in an effort 
to rehabilitate. 
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State exemptions are not constructed to enable a debtor’s 
rehabilitation. Rather, state exemptions serve other purposes. 
Chief among these purposes: (i) preventing debtors from becoming 
wards of the state, (ii) providing a guarantee of some minimal level 
of subsistence, and (iii) serving the societal function of preserving 
families. These justifications and purposes, explored below, are 
collectively referred to as the “Independent Subsistence Function” 
of state property exemptions. 
Preventing debtor dependence on state benefits is an 
important prong of the Independent Subsistence Function. 
Legislatures answer the question of whether losses from debtors 
unable to pay their bills should be allocated to unsecured creditors 
(prevented from seizing and selling exempt property) or to the 
state in the form of transfer payments and social welfare benefits. 
Maintaining some level of property exempt from creditor seizure 
favors the state by decreasing the number of debtors becoming 
public charges.13 
In adopting exemptions, states typically seek to establish a 
subsistence “floor” for debtors. In Georgia, for instance, the 
“purpose and reason for the enactment of the exemption statutes 
was to allow the family of the debtor to retain at least some 
items . . . in order that the family might have the barest essentials 
for human existence.”14 Among state exemptions, homestead 
provisions are often connected to preservation of the family 
structure. In enacting homestead exemptions, state legislatures 
rely on public policy considerations, including maintaining the 
stability of families. The “preservation of the home is of para-
mount importance because there the family may be sheltered 
and preserved.”15 
In sharp contrast, the paramount justification for federal bank-
ruptcy exemptions is the debtor’s interest in retaining property to 
 
 13. See, e.g., Cadle Co. v. Pegasus Ranch, Inc., 920 So. 2d 1276, 1278 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2006) (citing Slatcoff v. Dezen, 76 So. 2d 792, 794 (Fla. 1954) (en banc)). 
 14. Rietz v. Butler, 322 F. Supp. 1029, 1031 (N.D. Ga. 1971). 
 15. In re Rutland, 318 B.R. 588, 590 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2004) (quoting First Ala. Bank 
v. Renfro, 452 So. 2d 464, 468 (Ala. 1984)). In Iowa, the homestead benefit seeks to secure 
the “social benefit which accrues to the state by having families secure in their homes.” In 
re McClain’s Estate, 262 N.W. 666, 669 (Iowa 1935). 
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enable a meaningful opportunity at a “fresh start.”16 This 
justification is the “Fresh Start Function.”17 Much of this justi-
fication has resulted from the evolution and maturation of 
bankruptcy law from a strictly creditor-centered liquidation 
procedure to a mechanism for individuals to seek relief and 
restoration. Concerns about providing debtors a path to “fresh 
starts” were of paramount importance in the debate leading to the 
enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, now referred to 
as the Bankruptcy Code. The focus on “fresh starts” enjoyed a 
conspicuous start of its own. 
Specifically, in 1970, Congress created the Commission on 
Bankruptcy Laws (the Commission) to “study, analyze, evaluate, 
and recommend” changes to the bankruptcy laws.18 “The 
Commission’s study, analysis, and evaluation shall include a 
consideration of the basic philosophy of bankruptcy . . . and all 
other matters which the Commission shall deem relevant.”19 
Between the findings and recommendations of the Commission, 
and the legislative process that ensued, one consensus was clear: 
exemptions in bankruptcy were viewed as integral to the 
“fresh start.” 
In 1973, the Commission issued its report to Congress and 
recommended a revised Bankruptcy Act.20 In that report, the 
Commission identified two equally important functions of bank-
ruptcy law: (i) to continue the orderly credit economy in the event 
of a debtor’s inability or unwillingness to pay his debts and 
(ii) rehabilitate debtors for “continued and more value-production 
 
 16. While the legislative record preceding enactment of the federal exemptions 
contains references to concerns that debtors in bankruptcy avoid complete destitution, the 
fresh start was the defining policy justifying federal exemptions in bankruptcy. See infra 
notes 41–44 and accompanying text. 
 17. To be sure, the legislative record in the debate about bankruptcy exemptions 
contains references to some congressional concerns about debtors avoiding destitution. In 
this sense, the Independent Subsistence Function and Fresh Start Function are not 
completely mutually exclusive. The concern about debtor rehabilitation is, however, a 
peculiarly federal policy. 
 18. S.J. Res. 88, 91st Cong. (1970). 
 19. Id. 
 20. H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pts. I, II, and III (1973) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT]. 
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participation, i.e., to provide a meaningful ‘fresh start.’”21 
Tellingly, the report observed that: 
The primary function of the bankruptcy system is to con-
tinue the law-based orderliness of the open credit economy in 
the event of a debtor’s inability or unwillingness generally to 
pay his debts. . . . The second function of the bankruptcy process, 
on a par with the first, is to rehabilitate debtors for continued 
and more value-productive participation, i.e., to provide a mean-
ingful “fresh start.”22 
The Commission recommended “exclusive federal exemptions” 
because such uniformity would avoid “the unfairness of existing 
state exemption laws, most of which are archaic, some of which . . . 
are exceedingly niggardly, particularly as to urban residents.”23 
In many instances, the Commission drew explicit links 
between exemptions in bankruptcy and the “fresh start.” Con-
gress took note, and the legislative hearings surrounding the 
exemptions debate reflected a strong concern for the effect on 
“fresh starts.”24 The House version incorporated the recommen-
dations of the Commission and included federal uniform bank-
ruptcy exemptions. The House bill did not permit states to veto 
the federal exemptions. 
Proponents of the competing Senate bill argued, however, that 
states should continue to control exemptions. The Senate bill 
backers saw the House bill and the attendant federal exemptions 
as bestowing “instant affluence” on bankruptcy debtors. The 
Senate bill carried forward the Bankruptcy Act provision 
deferring to “non-bankruptcy law” as the source of exemptions. 
The resulting compromise, later codified in § 522, provided 
uniform federal exemptions along with an “opt out” feature for 
states, a political settlement described as a “strange compromise . . . 
[leading] to a bizarre result.”25 
 
 21. Id. at 71. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 171. 
 24. For a more thorough review of the Commission and related legislative history, 
see infra Section I.C.2. 
 25. Richard I. Aaron, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: The Full-Employment-for-
Lawyers Bill, Part II: Consumer Bankruptcy, 1979 UTAH L. REV. 175, 183 (1979). 
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Some defenders of the opt-out provision assumed that as part 
of deliberating and arriving at the decision to opt out, states would 
be occasioned to “reexamine” their own exemption schemes. While 
it is unclear how many states undertook a reexamination, virtually 
no opt-out state undertook meaningful efforts at exemption reform 
as part of enacting opt-out legislation. As a result, exemptions 
justified by and seeking to serve the Independent Subsistence 
Function, rather than the Fresh Start Function, remain the only 
exemptions available to bankrupt debtors in many opt-out states. 
B. States Without Power to Grant Fresh Starts 
It is not surprising that state exemptions were not designed to 
advance the Fresh Start Function. In fact, states lack a funda-
mental constitutional power that would permit an exemption to 
serve this function: because states cannot impair contractual rights 
of creditors, states do not have the power to grant a discharge. 
Only the federal government has such power. 
The Contracts Clause states that “[n]o State shall . . . pass 
any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . .”26 Chief 
Justice Marshall succinctly summarized the general purpose of the 
Contracts Clause: 
The power of changing the relative situation of debtor and 
creditor, of interfering with contracts, a power which comes 
home to every man, touches the interest of all, and controls the 
conduct of every individual in those things which he supposes 
to be proper for his own exclusive management, had been used 
to such an excess by the state legislatures, as to break in upon the 
ordinary intercourse of society, and destroy all confidence 
between man and man. This mischief had become so great, so 
alarming, as not only to impair commercial intercourse, and 
threaten the existence of credit, but to sap the morals of the 
people, and destroy the sanctity of private faith. To guard 
against the continuance of the evil was an object of deep interest 
with all the truly wise, as well as the virtuous, of this great 
 
 26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
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community, and was one of the important benefits expected 
from a reform of the government.27 
While the prohibition against states impairing contracts is not 
absolute,28 the Court has used the Clause to strike down state 
statutes on this basis.29 Furthermore, it is clear that “a relatively 
strict standard of [Contracts Clause] review [extends] to legislative 
interference with private as well as public contracts.”30 State laws 
that render contracts “invalid, or releases or extinguishes them[,]” 
may impair obligations in the constitutionally proscribed sense.31 
Accordingly, any state law granting a debtor discharge from his 
creditor obligations could be challenged on the basis of a 
Contracts Clause violation. 
As a consequence, states cannot grant debtors an essential 
ingredient of a fresh start—the discharge. This limitation further 
illustrates why general state exemptions are not designed to serve 
the Fresh Start Function. State exemptions do not—indeed, absent 
bankruptcy, cannot—provide debtors with the clean slate needed 
to pursue financial rehabilitation. Though exemptions can grant 
enhanced property rights, states cannot relieve debtors of their 
obligations to pay existing debts. 32 
 
 27. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 428 (1934) (quoting Ogden v. 
Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 354–55 (1827)). 
 28. Id. 
 29. See, e.g., Rediscovering the Contract Clause, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1414 (1984). 
 30. Id. at 1417. 
 31. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 431. Some scholars have discussed the Contracts Clause as 
prohibiting any law that permitted states themselves to escape paying creditors. For instance, 
in a recent article exploring the idea of allowing states to file bankruptcy, Professor Skeel 
noted that “[s]tate bankruptcy might … encounter turbulence under the Contracts Clause, 
because it would alter existing contracts, which the states themselves ordinarily cannot 
do.” David A. Skeel Jr., States of Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 677, 707 (2012). 
 32. With rare exceptions, exemptions protect against claims by unsecured creditors, 
as most exemptions schemes do not allow impairment of a properly perfected lien held by 
a secured creditor. For example, 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(2) reflects the long-standing state law 
principle that a security interest may not be impaired by a property exemption. One 
notable exception allows a debtor in bankruptcy to avoid non-possessory, non-PMSI liens 
that impair her exemptions in certain types of property. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (2012). Viewed 
broadly, when § 522(f) was enacted as part of the 1978 Code, it attempted to shift leverage 
away from certain secured creditors and toward debtors. This section has been a source of 
discontent among some academics and practitioners. While Congress amended the 
language of § 522(f) in 1994 to address some of the textual and functional concerns raised 
by courts and commentators, critics remained. See Lawrence Ponoroff, Exemption Impairing 
 
02.SULLIVAN_FIN_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/7/18  10:02 AM 
335 A Fresh Start to Bankruptcy Exemptions 
 347 
C. Exemptions in Bankruptcy 
The subject of exemptions has been addressed in each of the 
five bankruptcy acts Congress enacted from 1800 to 1978. The 
constitutional requirement of “uniform Laws” provides a textual 
signal that exemptions in bankruptcy should enjoy some dimen-
sion of uniformity. Early on, it was so. Over the span of the 
nineteenth century and four bankruptcy acts, the treatment of 
exemptions in bankruptcy morphed from basic uniform federal 
exemptions to a hybrid of federal and state exemptions, settling 
with the Bankruptcy Act in 1898 providing an exemption scheme 
with no federal exemptions that granted complete deference to 
exemption laws of the various states. This “state law only” 
exemption structure survived from 1898 until the 1978 Act. In 
1978, Congress enacted the first set of detailed (and uniform) 
federal bankruptcy exemptions. Each state was, however, empow-
ered to opt out of the federal exemptions. Over two-thirds of the 
states exercised this power. 
1. Historical synopsis of exemptions in bankruptcy: The first four acts, 
1800 to 1898 
The first three bankruptcy acts were in response to national 
financial crises, and each was repealed within a few years of 
passage. Following ratification of the Constitution, the first 
century of the United States was marked by the general absence, 
interrupted by brief exceptions, of any national bankruptcy law. 
Indeed, until 1898, when Congress passed the first “permanent” 
bankruptcy law, no national bankruptcy law existed in 93 of the 
first 109 years following ratification. 
The original congressional expression of bankruptcy law 
resulted in enactment of the Bankruptcy Act of 1800. Unsurpris-
ingly, this Act was modeled on British bankruptcy law. The 1800 
Act provided federal exemptions that were both limited and 
uniform.33 The 1800 Act was repealed after three years34 and was 
 
Liens Under Bankruptcy Code Section 522(f): One Step Forward and One Step Back, 70 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 1, 34–37 (1999). 
 33. Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19, repealed by Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 
248. Exemptions were limited to necessities such as wearing apparel and bedding. Id. at 23. 
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followed next by the Bankruptcy Act of 1841.35 The 1841 Act 
echoed the uniform federal exemptions of the 1800 Act by pre-
scribing bankruptcy exemptions for necessities such as wearing 
apparel and household furniture not exceeding an aggregate 
value of $300.00.36 Neither act permitted state law exemptions 
in bankruptcy.37 
State exemptions made an entrance into bankruptcy exemp-
tion law with the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, which 
for the first time referred to the exemption laws of states. The 1867 
Act introduced a hybrid system of exemptions, providing a 
uniform set of federal exemptions that were supplemented by the 
exemption laws of the states. For the first time in American 
history, state exemption laws played a prominent role in 
determining the size of the bankruptcy estate available for 
distribution to creditors. The final nineteenth-century iteration of 
bankruptcy law was the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, in which 
Congress completely removed federal exemptions. The 1898 Act 
required that property exempt in bankruptcy be determined 
solely by reference to laws of the state of domicile of the debtor. 
This state-law-only structure for bankruptcy exemptions would 
continue until the adoption of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978. 
2. The (optional) federal exemptions of the 1978 Code 
In 1978, the Bankruptcy Code was enacted and included the 
concurrent federal-exemptions-plus-opt-out structure. This ex-
emption system, never fully debated or vetted, resulted from a 
last-minute compromise between the House and Senate. The 
former required uniform federal exemptions as a floor to which 
states could add, while the latter continued the 1898 Act’s 
deference to states to determine all exemptions in bankruptcy. 
Congress essentially ignored the unanimous recommendation 
of the Commission for mandatory uniform federal exemptions. The 
 
 34. Id. at 19. 
 35. Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440, repealed by Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 
Stat. 614. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See, e.g., Rhett Frimet, The Birth of Bankruptcy in the United States, 96 COM. L.J. 160, 
185–87 (1991). 
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Commission had recommended that the new federal exemptions 
displace state exemptions, rendering the latter irrelevant in 
bankruptcy. Although appealing in some ways, the idea of having 
an exclusive and uniform set of federal exemptions in bankruptcy 
poses its own significant challenges and limitations.38 
 a. The commission report and political compromise. An in-depth 
review of the Commission report (the Report) and legislative 
history behind the concurrent exemptions scheme provides con-
text and a base from which the role of exemptions as integral to 
the “fresh start” is confirmed. 
The review begins in 1970. In that year, Congress created a 
Commission on Bankruptcy Laws to study, analyze, and recom-
mend changes in bankruptcy law.39 The Commission identified 
two equally important functions of bankruptcy law: 
The primary function of the bankruptcy system is to conti-
nue the law-based orderliness of the open credit economy in the 
 
 38. Following years of scholarly criticism of the concurrent exemptions scheme of 
the Code, a second movement began to call for Congress to move to exclusive uniform 
federal exemptions in bankruptcy. NAT’L BANKR. REVIEW COMM’N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT 
TWENTY YEARS (Oct. 20, 1997) [hereinafter BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS], 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/reportcont.html. As with the recommendations from 
the 1970s commission, Congress did not act on the 1997 call for exemptions uniformity and 
exclusivity at the federal level. One of the basic arguments against forcing uniform federal 
exemptions on bankrupts relates to the differences in cost of living between the states. If 
Congress determined that a homestead exemption for a bankrupt is $15,000, is this 
generous enough in a high cost of living state like Rhode Island or New York? Is $15,000 
too generous in a low cost of living state like Oklahoma or Mississippi? Such a uniform rule 
would be facially “uniform” but practically disuniform in application and outcomes, 
depending on where a debtor resides. Other costs of imposing a uniform federal set of 
exemptions are equally concerning, though perhaps less obvious to the casual observer. As 
explained by Professor Marcus Cole: 
The central point of recognizing the federalist character of bankruptcy law is 
to highlight the potential value of disparate substantive regimes across states, 
and the costs incurred by individuals and society when these differences are 
erased. If the purpose of federalist structures is to provide for a range of free 
choice among competing regimes for the benefit of individuals, harmonization 
imposes a cost upon individuals and, in the aggregate, on social welfare. This 
cost, referred to [] as the ‘federalist cost’ of harmonizing substantive law, is small 
when jurisdictions arrive at agreement as to substantive legal rules. The 
federalist cost is large, however, where the states vary dramatically, as in the case 
of property exemption law. 
G. Marcus Cole, The Federalist Costs of Bankruptcy Exemption Reform, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 227, 
230 (2000). 
 39. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 20, at 1. 
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event of a debtor’s inability or unwillingness generally to pay his 
debts. . . . The second function of the bankruptcy process, on a 
par with the first, is to rehabilitate debtors for continued and 
more value-productive participation, i.e., to provide a meaning-
ful “fresh start.”40 
The Commission found that the exemption provision of the 
state-exemptions-only feature of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 
was ineffective.41 
The Commission ultimately recommended exclusive federal 
exemptions beginning with a nucleus of “kinds of property that 
traditionally have been treated as exempt by state governments” 
with “appropriate federal maximums.”42 According to the Com-
mission, uniformity would prevent the unfairness of the existing 
state exemption laws.43 
Public debate regarding the Commission’s proposal brought 
comments from the National Bankruptcy Conference and the 
National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges.44 Both organizations 
approved of federal uniformity in the exemption area but took the 
position that “the federal law should only establish a floor, 
‘leaving the states free to prescribe more generous exemptions for 
their domiciliaries if they see fit to do so.’”45 The proposal by the 
National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges provided uniform 
federal exemptions as a floor with state exemptions available as an 
alternative.46 However, the Commission rejected this idea, find-
ing that the differences between generous exemptions states and 
others were too pronounced and could lead to imbalances 
among debtors.47 
The Commission’s proposal was introduced in Congress in 
1973 and 1974. The subcommittees of the House and Senate 
 
 40. Id. at 71 (alteration in original). 
 41. Id. at 169. 
 42. Id. at 171. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. J. Ronald Trost & Lawrence P. King, Congress and Bankruptcy Reform Circa 1977, 
33 BUS. LAW. 489, 524 (1978) (quoting Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 
32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th 
Cong. app., § 4-503, at 356 (1975–76)) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Act Revision]. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 170 (statement of Professor Frank R. Kennedy). 
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Judiciary Committees held hearings, and witnesses appeared in 
support of both proposals. At the hearings, a representative of the 
American Bankers Association and the Consumer Bankers Asso-
ciation stated the following: 
I do not think that you are going to be able to get total 
uniformity [in exemptions], because I do not believe that States 
[with exemptions higher than those proposed] are going to be 
receptive to the reduction in that they feel that it will not afford 
the proper protection for the consumers or [sic] their States; and 
conversely I do not feel that some States with lower minimums 
are going to feel at all comfortable with the positions taken by 
the higher exemption status.48 
Other witnesses agreed. “I know there is going to be a lot of 
opposition in States like Texas and California, where the exemp-
tions are generous . . . .”49 
The House and Senate completed their hearings, and the 
House Subcommittee drafted a new bill, introduced in the House 
in 1977 as H.R. 6.50 Until this bill, most of the opposition to the 
federal exemptions had focused on the drawbacks of placing a 
ceiling on state exemptions. H.R. 6 set a federal floor for exemp-
tions but permitted states to set higher exemptions. One 
Congressman noted, when introducing H.R. 6, that “federal 
exemptions were necessary because ‘many states have not 
rewritten their exemption laws since the 19th Century, most are 
outmoded and hopelessly inadequate.’”51 H.R. 6 was replaced by 
H.R. 8200, which contained essentially the same exemptions. H.R. 
8200 set a federal floor for exemptions but permitted debtors to 
choose those exemptions provided by state and federal non-
bankruptcy law as an alternative. The House Report on H.R. 8200 
stated the following: 
 
 48. The Bankruptcy Reform Act: Hearings on S. 235 and S. 236 Before the Subcomm. on 
Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 135–36 (1975) 
(statement of Walter W. Vaughan). 
 49. Bankruptcy Act Revision, supra note 45, at 358 (statement of Vern Countryman) 
 50. H.R. 6, 95th Cong. (1977), introduced on January 4, 1977, 123 CONG. REC. 
125 (1977). 
 51. 123 CONG. REC. H21 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Don Edwards). 
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Under current law, what property is exempt is determined 
under State law. However, some State exemption laws have not 
been revised in this century. Most are outmoded, designed for 
more rural times, and hopelessly inadequate to serve the needs 
of and provide a fresh start for modern urban debtors. The 
historical purpose of these exemption laws has been to protect a 
debtor from his creditors, to provide him with the basic 
necessities of life so that even if his creditors levy on all of his 
nonexempt property, the debtor will not be left destitute and a 
public charge. The purpose has not changed, but neither have 
the level of exemptions in many States. Thus, the purpose has 
largely been defeated. 
Though exemption laws have been considered within the 
province of State law under the current Bankruptcy Act, H.R. 
8200 adopts the position that there is a Federal interest in seeing 
that a debtor that goes through bankruptcy comes out with 
adequate possessions to begin his fresh start. Recognizing, 
however, the circumstances do vary in different parts of the 
country, the bill permits the States to set exemption levels 
appropriate to the locale, and allows debtors to choose between 
the State exemptions and the Federal exemptions provided in the 
bill. Thus, the bill continues to recognize the States’ interest in 
regulating credit within the States, but enunciates a bankruptcy 
policy favoring a fresh start.52 
The Report further noted that an individual debtor may choose 
between exemption systems. The debtor may choose the federal 
exemptions or the exemptions that he is entitled to under other 
federal law or the law of the state of his domicile.53 H.R. 8200 did 
not permit states to preempt or veto the federal exemptions. 
The Senate introduced a competing bill, S. 2266. This bill 
provided that exemptions would be governed solely by non-
bankruptcy law and thus omitted the House’s proposed bill that 
included a federal exemptions floor. The National Bankruptcy 
Conference warned the Subcommittee that “S. 2266 would delete 
or seriously impair most of the provisions in H.E. [sic] 8200 that 
 
 52. H.R. REP. NO. 95–595, at 126 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6087 
(footnote call number omitted). 
 53. 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6316. 
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make the debtor’s fresh start, a basic bankruptcy concept, 
more meaningful.”54 
[One] aspect of a meaningful fresh start is exemptions. 
Presently, the Bankruptcy Act provides an ineffective System by 
incorporating the exemption laws of the various states. Many 
States provide little exemption benefits to a debtor. The House 
Bill also permits the use of State law, but contains a Federal 
alternative which assures at least uniform minimum benefits. 
The Senate Bill returns us to the present system which has 
proven unsatisfactory, as indicated in the previous hearings be-
fore the Senate and House Subcommittees and the Report of the 
Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States.55 
However, proponents of the Senate Bill continued to argue 
that states should control exemptions.56 The Senate Judiciary 
Committee stated in the report on S. 2266 the following: “The 
committee feels that the policy of the bankruptcy law is to provide 
a fresh start, but not instant affluence, as would be possible under 
the provisions of H.R. 8200.”57 
As enacted, § 522(b) was a compromise between the House 
and Senate proposals. Each state was allowed, ultimately, the 
power to “opt out” of the federal exemptions.58 This scheme 
resulted from a fluky political compromise, under which Congress 
adopted a concurrent system.59 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: Hearings on S. 2266 and H.R. 8200 Before the 
Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Mach. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 
835 (1977). 
 56. S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 6 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5792. 
 57. Id. (“H.R. 8200 would establish 11 categories of property for the Federal 
exemption, among which is a homestead exemption of $10,000. Such a provision in joint 
cases would result in a husband choosing State exemptions while a wife might choose 
Federal exemptions. Together, they could thus retain after bankruptcy, very substantial 
amounts of property while their debts would have been discharged.”). 
 58. Technically, the federal exemptions are “bankruptcy specific exemptions,” as 
they are only available in bankruptcy. In this article, “bankruptcy specific exemptions” 
refer to state law exemptions that apply only in bankruptcy. See infra Section III.B. 
 59. The legislative process resulting in the enactment of § 522 has, itself, attracted 
critics. For scholars viewing uniformity as a positive restriction on congressional power, 
deferring exemptions to the states is antithetical to the purpose of the Bankruptcy Clause. 
For instance, one scholar provided this critical characterization of the legislative process: 
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 b. The 1994 reform effort. Nearly two decades after the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was passed, Congress faced 
another movement to enact further reforms and refinements to the 
Bankruptcy Code. The resulting legislation was the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1994. 
Although none of the 1994 reforms affected the concurrent 
exemptions scheme of § 522, the legislative process provided an 
opportunity to revisit the subject of bankruptcy exemptions. The 
National Bankruptcy Review Commission (the 1994 Commission) 
was an independent commission established pursuant to the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994.60 The purpose of the Commission 
included a broad charge to “investigate and study issues relating 
to the Bankruptcy Code . . . .”61 
The 1994 Commission issued its final report, entitled 
Bankruptcy: The Next Twenty Years62 (the 1994 Report), and included 
 
The legislative history of section 522 reveals an overly deferential attitude to 
state power and a confused notion of uniformity that beclouded the deliberations 
of legislators. 
. . . . 
The opt-out proviso was part of neither the Senate nor House bill but 
appeared as an excrescence of the final draft of section 522. This draft resulted 
from a frenzied attempt by an informal conference committee to iron out the 
differences between the two bills. The conference committee apparently did not 
consider the constitutionality of the opt-out provision. Concerning the states’ 
authority to reject federal exemptions, Senator DeConcini remarked that ‘it was 
agreed that a Federal exemption standard will be codified but that the States 
could at any time reject them in which case the State exemption laws would 
continue to prevail.’ 
. . . . 
History leaves little doubt that the parochial interests enshrined in state 
exemption laws were among the precise evils impending national commerce and 
credit addressed by the Framers and are better viewed as the intended victims of 
an exercise of the bankruptcy power than as its beneficiaries. 
Judith Schenck Koffler, The Bankruptcy Clause and Exemptions Laws: A Reexamination of the 
Doctrine of Geographic Uniformity, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 22, 92–96 (1983) (emphasis omitted). 
While the opt-out has been challenged on constitutional grounds, the courts have declined 
to disturb the opt-out provision. See In re Sullivan, 680 F.2d 1131 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 
Sullivan v. United States, 459 U.S. 992 (1982) (opt-out provisions of § 522 are constitutional 
under the Bankruptcy and Supremacy Clauses). But see Tracey Nicolau Bosomworth, 
Federal Exemptions and the Opt-Out Provisions of Section 522: A Constitutional Challenge, 58 
IND. L.J. 143 (1982). 
 60. NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, NBRC Fact Sheet, GOVINFO (Aug. 12, 1997), http:// 
govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/facts.html. 
 61. Id. 
 62. BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS, supra note 38, at Table of Contents. 
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several reports prepared by various professors and government 
agencies.63 One of the reports prepared and attached in the 
appendix of the 1994 Report was written by Judge William H. 
Brown and Professor Lawrence Ponoroff. That report, entitled 
Analysis of Bankruptcy Exemption Policy, argued in favor of a 
national, mandatory federal property exemption scheme, which 
would “[recognize] that the fresh start in bankruptcy is a matter of 
federal, not state, concern.”64 
One of the chapters of the 1994 Report, entitled Property 
Exemptions, revisited and discussed the purpose of allowing 
certain property to be exempted in bankruptcy.65 Among other 
things, the report discussed some of the policy reasons supporting 
exemptions, noting that debtors cannot go to work without 
clothes nor can they perform their jobs without “tools of their 
trades.”66 The exemptions provided by the Bankruptcy Code 
“preserve citizens’ ability and incentive to earn and pay taxes.”67 
This ensures that citizens are able to be productive members 
of society.68 
The 1994 Report traced the history of exemptions in 
bankruptcy and noted that the role of exemptions had evolved as 
bankruptcy law had matured. 
As the Bankruptcy Act [of 1898] weathered the evolution of 
debtor-creditor relations throughout the Twentieth Century, the 
goals of the consumer bankruptcy system matured and diverged more 
sharply from those of state law creditor collection statutes. Although 
exemptions should not be unnecessarily generous, grossly insufficient 
state exemptions were inconsistent with rehabilitating failing families 
and encouraging work and self-sufficiency.69 
 
 63. See id. 
 64. WILLIAM H. BROWN & LAWRENCE PONOROFF, Analysis of Bankruptcy Exemption 
Policy, in BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS, supra note 38, at app. G(1)(b), http:// 
govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/report/g1b.pdf. 
 65. NAT’L BANKR. REVIEW COMM’N, Property Exemptions, in BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT 
TWENTY YEARS, supra note 38, at 117, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/report/05ccons.pdf. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 119 (emphasis added). 
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The 1994 Report was one of the first sources to note that 
bankruptcy served different purposes than state collection laws.  
This acknowledgement reflected the modern role of bankruptcy 
law in facilitating debtor rehabilitation and the important role 
exemptions play in furtherance of that goal. 
II. LANDSCAPE OF EXEMPTIONS IN STATES 
The extent to which exemption dollar amounts of categories 
still differ among states remains striking. In opt-out states, these 
state exemptions define what exemptions are available to bank-
rupt debtors. 
Variations among state exemption schemes have a strong 
historical foundation and reflect, in some cases, “holdovers” from 
the nineteenth century when many of these schemes were enacted. 
Efforts to nationalize state general exemption standards have fallen 
flat. Very flat.70 
The two common variables among state exemptions are the 
categories and dollar amounts of property protected. In general, 
the types of property protected by exemptions can be colloquially 
understood as “consumer property,”71 with one common and 
notable exception—“tools of the trade.”72 
 
 70. Organized national efforts to reform state property exemption laws have failed 
to gain any traction. For instance, in the 1970s, the National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State laws proposed a Uniform Exemptions Act. Only one state, Alaska, 
adopted this Model Act. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 09.38.010, .015, .017 (West, Westlaw 
through Chap. 13 of 2018 Second Regular Legis. Sess.). Intrastate calls for exemption reform 
continue, though such calls are rare. See generally Lee Harrington, Time for Change: Bringing 
Massachusetts Homestead and Personal Property Exemptions into the Twenty-First Century, 4 
S. NEW ENG. ROUNDTABLE SYMP. L.J. 1, 11–20 (2009). 
 71. Expanding Article 2 notions of “goods” to, here, include homesteads. 
 72. One “nonconsumer” category of an individual’s or family’s property commonly 
protected under exemption laws is “tools of the trade.” This category is explicitly 
mentioned in both federal and some state exemptions laws. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(6) 
(2016) (exempting a certain dollar amount of “any implements, professional books, or tools 
of the trade of the debtor or the trade of any dependent of the debtor”). Some state 
exemption statutes provide definitional parameters that are broad. For instance, the Texas 
definition includes “tools, equipment, books, and apparatus, including boats and motor 
vehicles used in a trade or profession . . . .” TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002(4) (West, 
Westlaw through 2017 Regular Sess. and First Called Legis. Sess.). 
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A. General, Bankruptcy-Neutral State Exemptions 
Most state exemption schemes assign specific dollar amounts 
to each protected category. For instance, in Wyoming, each person 
is entitled to exempt, among other things, $2,000 worth of 
“wearing apparel.”73 In terms of personal property exemptions, 
other states provide set dollar amounts and allow individuals to 
“spend” this amount electing items from an approved list of 
exemptible property. Texas, for instance, provides one of the most 
generous aggregations for personal property, allowing an indivi-
dual $50,000 and a family $100,000 budgeted to exempt items 
from a list including home furnishings, wearing apparel, jewelry, 
firearms, and “athletic and sporting equipment, including bi-
cycles.”74 Almost no state employs a “wild card” feature, which 
allows any unused dollar amount in one approved category to be 
applied to another.75 
Homestead exemptions, in particular, vary wildly from state 
to state. For example, Wyoming allows a $20,000 homestead 
exemption, while Washington has a homestead exemption of 
$125,000.76 Nevada has a homestead exemption of $550,000.77 
Famously, some states such as Texas and Florida have unlimited 
homestead exemptions. At the other end of the spectrum, 
Virginia’s homestead exemption is only $5,000.78 Similarly, 
Kentucky and West Virginia both have a homestead exemption of 
only $5,000.79 
 
 73. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-20-105 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Gen. Legis. Sess.). 
 74. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 42.001–.002. 
 75. Federal exemptions provide a particularly advantageous “wild card” option. For 
debtors living in states that have not opted out, a debtor who either (i) does not claim a 
homestead exemption (read: renters or homeowners with little to no equity) or (ii) claims 
but does not use the entire federal homestead exemption amount has the option of using 
the lesser of $11,500 or the amount of unused homestead to exempt “any property.” 11 
U.S.C. § 522(d)(5). This wild card amount is in addition to other specific categories and 
amounts listed in § 522(d)(1)–(4) and (6)–(12).  See supra Section II.C.2. 
 76. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 6.13.030 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Regular Legis. 
Sess.); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-20-101. 
 77. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 115.010 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Regular Legis. Sess.). 
 78. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-4 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Regular Legis. Sess. and 
Sp. Sess.). 
 79. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 427.060 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Regular Legis. Sess.); 
W. VA. CODE § 38-9-1 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Regular Legis. Sess). 
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Another important exemption—the exemption for motor 
vehicles—varies significantly among various states. Alaska has an 
exemption for motor vehicles of $3,000 if the value of the car is 
less than $20,000.80 California’s motor vehicle exemption only 
allows an exemption for vehicles up to $2,300.81 Florida has one of 
the lowest, providing only a $1,000 motor vehicle exemption.82 
Georgia, on the other hand, does not have any motor vehicle 
exemption.83 Nor does Pennsylvania. 
As a general matter, there is neither continuity nor predictabil-
ity with respect to the exemptions allowed by each state. For 
example, Rhode Island has large homestead and motor vehicle 
exemptions, with a $500,000 homestead and a $12,000 motor 
vehicle exemption.84 By contrast, not only does Tennessee have a 
low homestead exemption of only $5,000, it does not have a motor 
vehicle exemption at all.85 Pennsylvania does not provide any sort 
of homestead exemption, instead choosing to provide only a $300 
exemption that may be applied to any property of the 
judgment debtor.86 
B. State Bankruptcy-Specific Exemption Schemes 
Since the passage of the Code, a small handful of states has 
engaged in marginal experimentation with bankruptcy-specific 
exemptions.87 Most of these experiments resulted in modest and 
narrow bankruptcy-specific exemptions. For instance, Ohio, an 
opt-out state, enacted a law permitting debtors in bankruptcy to 
exempt four hundred dollars of “walking around” money in cash 
 
 80. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.38.020 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 13 of 2018 Second 
Regular Legis. Sess.). 
 81. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 704.010 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 13 of 2018 Regular 
Legis. Sess.). 
 82. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.25 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Second Regular Legis. Sess.). 
 83. See GA. CODE ANN. § 44-13-1 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Legis. Sess.). 
 84. See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 9-26-4, 4.1 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 30, Jan. 2018 
Legis. Sess.). 
 85. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-2-301 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Second Regular 
Legis. Sess.). 
 86. See 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8123 (West, Westlaw through 2018 
Regular Sess. Acts 1–27, 30). However, Pennsylvania permits its residents to use federal 
exemptions in bankruptcy.  
 87. See infra Appendix A for a summary of the state enactments of bankruptcy-
specific exemptions and related cases. 
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or a bank account.88 Other states provided enhanced exemption 
rights in bankruptcy for property held in certain legal forms, such 
as retirement accounts or pensions.89 
Concerning bankruptcy-specific exemptions, states generally 
fall into one of two camps. Most states have never formally 
considered bankruptcy-specific exemptions. A much smaller group 
of states has enacted modest and narrow bankruptcy-specific 
exemptions that were later repealed or not expanded. The tepid 
experimentation of the latter group can be explained, in part, by 
legal challenges that chilled legislative action. In some cases, 
courts determined that state bankruptcy-specific-exemption schemes 
were unconstitutional. Some states responded by repealing the 
affected statutes. Others simply stopped experimenting with 
bankruptcy-specific exemptions. In fact, since the late 1990s, 
Michigan and Delaware stand alone as the only states to have 
undertaken an effort to pass meaningful, and somewhat compre-
hensive, reforms.90 
Constitutional challenges have been leveled against state 
bankruptcy-specific exemptions on two bases: that such schemes 
(i) are preempted under the Supremacy Clause and (ii) run afoul of 
the Bankruptcy Clause’s uniformity requirement. In the face of 
constitutional uncertainty, some states repealed their laws.91 While 
impossible to predict or quantify with certainty, efforts in other 
 
 88. The pertinent section of the statute provides: 
  Every person who is domiciled in this state may hold property exempt from 
execution, garnishment, attachment, or sale to satisfy a judgment or order, as 
follows: 
. . . . 
The person’s interest, not to exceed five hundred twenty-five dollars in any 
particular item or ten thousand seven hundred seventy-five dollars in aggregate 
value, in household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appliances, 
books, animals, crops, musical instruments, firearms, and hunting and fishing 
equipment that are held primarily for the personal, family, or household use of 
the person . . . . 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.66(A), (4)(a), (17) (West, Westlaw through File 66 of 2017–18 
Gen. Assembly, 2017 State Issue 1, 2018 State Issue 1). 
 89. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 13-54-104 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 273 of 
2018 Second Regular Sess.). 
90. See infra Sections III.B and C. 
91. See infra Appendix A. 
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states were suppressed by conflicting court decisions concerning 
whether bankruptcy-specific exemptions were constitutional. 
III. STATE BANKRUPTCY-SPECIFIC EXEMPTION SCHEMES 
ARE CONSTITUTIONAL 
Since the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, state 
legislative efforts to enact or expand bankruptcy-specific exemp-
tions have occurred in an environment attended by uncertainty. 
Much of this uncertainty springs from somewhat unresolved 
questions concerning the constitutionality of these schemes.92 
A. Prevailing “Permissive” Conception of Uniformity 
The text of Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 of the Constitution 
provides that Congress shall have the power to establish “uniform 
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United 
States.”93 The historical context surrounding the inclusion of this 
language in the Constitution is important, though not parti-
cularly enlightening. A fair characterization would stamp the 
Bankruptcy Clause as a late addition to the Constitution. The 
meaning and import of “uniform Laws” has been the subject of 
much debate. Does “uniform” expand the power granted 
Congress, or does it serve as a restriction on that power? In 
essence, the Court has adopted a construction of “uniform” 
consistent with the expanded power theory: Congress has the 
 
 92. One dynamic present in analyses of the constitutionality of these state laws is the 
fact that they are, in fact, state laws. In the context of uniformity scrutiny, the Bankruptcy 
Clause affects congressional actions, not state actions. For purposes of this article, a 
simplified method of viewing constitutional challenges to state laws involves framing the 
challenges as challenges to § 522 inasmuch as that section provides for the delegation of 
both the opt-out decision as well as determination of appropriate exemptions to states. 
Viewed this way, many of the attacks on state bankruptcy-specific exemptions actually 
challenge the constitutionality of Congress’s delegation of these decisions to the states 
within the construct of § 522. This distinction, while important and necessary, has been 
glossed over by some courts. For instance, in determining that Indiana’s law survived a 
uniformity challenge, a bankruptcy court simply concluded that the challenge “fails to 
recognize that the Uniformity Clause is not a restriction upon the states.” In re Cross, 255 
B.R. 25, 31 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2000). The court did not analyze whether the delegation in 
§ 522 could constitutionally permit a state to pass a bankruptcy-specific exemption law. Id. 
 93. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
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power to impose uniform bankruptcy laws that displace 
state laws. 
1. Doctrine of geographical uniformity 
In 1902, the Court in Hanover National Bank v. Moyses 
pronounced geographic uniformity as the outer limit of any 
uniformity restriction posed by the Bankruptcy Clause.94 Later 
cases eroded the efficacy of geographic uniformity as a limit, as 
the Court confirmed bankruptcy laws that appeared to violate the 
doctrine. Tellingly, the Court has only invoked uniformity to 
invalidate a bankruptcy law on a single occasion: striking down a 
bankruptcy law that, on its face, only applied to a single company. 
The construction of uniformity as a power95 was recently invoked 
by the Court to rationalize excepting state claims of sovereign 
immunity from effect in bankruptcy proceedings. 
Although the contours of uniformity have been meted out in a 
handful of cases, the Supreme Court has not directly addressed 
the effects of uniformity on bankruptcy exemptions since Moyses 
in 1902. Indeed, the Bankruptcy Clause’s requirement of “uniform 
Laws” in the specific context of bankruptcy exemptions has 
seldom been probed. 
Some early evidence supports the conclusion that the Framers 
intended “uniform Laws” to prohibit delegation of bankruptcy ex-
emption determinations to the states.96 The earliest bankruptcy acts 
(in 1800 and 1841) were consistent with this restrictive interpre-
tation by providing uniform federal bankruptcy exemptions to the 
exclusion of state exemptions.97 Soon after the Civil War, Congress 
passed the third bankruptcy act (in 1867) that included a provision 
incorporating the exemptions laws of the states for the first time. 
 
 94. Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188 (1902). 
 95. Formulating “uniform” as a source of enhancement to, rather than a restriction 
on, Congress’s power under the Bankruptcy Clause has been explored by some 
commentators. For instance, Judge Randolph Haines argues in favor of the power 
enhancement conception. Randolph J. Haines, The Uniformity Power: Why Bankruptcy Is 
Different, 77 AM. BANKR. L.J. 129 (2003). In supporting his conclusion, Judge Haines focused 
on the text, structure, context, and history of the language of the Bankruptcy Clause. Id. 
at 165–70. 
 96. See id. 
 97. See id. 
02.SULLIVAN_FIN_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/7/18  10:02 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2018 
362 
The 1867 Act introduced a hybrid system of base federal exemp-
tions that added state law exemptions. The three earliest bank-
ruptcy acts were short-lived, and each was repealed within a few 
years of being enacted. 
In 1898, Congress passed a bankruptcy act that entirely omit-
ted federal exemptions and relied completely on the exemption 
laws of the states. The 1898 Act continued in force until Congress 
passed the Code in 1978. In response to an early constitutional 
challenge to the 1898 Act, the Court in Moyses upheld the consti-
tutionality of incorporation of state exemptions in bankruptcy,98 
establishing the doctrine of geographical uniformity as the 
standard for uniformity challenges.99 
 a. Moyses sanctified non-uniform state laws in bankruptcy. Moyses 
involved a constitutional challenge to a feature of the Bankruptcy 
Act of 1898 that incorporated state law exemptions of the state 
where a bankruptcy case was filed.100 The debtor had moved from 
Missouri to Tennessee, and he filed bankruptcy in Tennessee 
claiming the property exemptions provided by that state’s laws. 
The debtor was granted a discharge using Tennessee exemptions. 
The debtor’s bank claimed that the Act was unconstitutional and 
violated the uniformity requirement by allowing incorporation of 
state exemption laws. The Court rejected the bank’s “personal 
uniformity” argument and announced that “uniformity is geo-
graphical.”101 The Court explained that constitutional uniformity 
is satisfied “when the trustee [in bankruptcy] takes in each state 
whatever would have been available to the creditor if the bank-
rupt law had not been passed.”102 Uniformity is not destroyed by 
states having different exemption laws, as the “general operation 
of the law is uniform although it may result in certain particulars 
differently in different states.”103 
Because geographical uniformity is not “personal,” Congress 
was liberated to pass bankruptcy laws acknowledging and 
 
 98. Moyses, 186 U.S. at 181. 
 99. Id. at 188. 
 100. Id. at 181. 
 101. Id. at 188. 
 102. Id. at 190. This language served as ammunition for attacks on bankruptcy specific 
exemption schemes passed after the 1978 Code and § 522. 
 103. Id. 
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incorporating differences in the laws of the various states, even 
when those differences are stark, as in the case of state exemptions. 
By requiring that bankruptcy laws merely ingrain procedural 
uniformity, the Court began defining the contours of constitutional 
uniformity in terms that were deferential to Congress. 
As conceived in Moyses, and developed in later cases, uni-
formity became a permissive concept.104 The Court signaled, and 
later ratified, the notion that bankruptcy laws will not fail under 
uniformity challenges absent a procedural disuniformity that 
treats members of the same class of debtors or creditors 
differently. Inherent in this doctrine is substantial deference given 
to Congress to define these “classes” of debtors and creditors. 
Because the 1898 Act provided a mechanism for incorporating 
exemption laws of the states, the base procedural uniformity 
requirement was satisfied in Moyses; all debtors in Tennessee 
could avail themselves of the Tennessee exemptions. 
This permissive conception of uniformity finds some support 
in history. While the circumstances surrounding the addition of 
the Bankruptcy Clause during the Convention lend few clues to 
the meaning of “uniform Laws,” some evidence suggests that 
proponents were primarily concerned with Congress having the 
power to impose uniform laws on the states.105 Prior to the 
Constitution, many states had their own bankruptcy laws. 
Problems arose from the absence of a mechanism to force one state 
from recognizing a discharge granted by a sister state. Through 
the Bankruptcy Clause and Contracts Clause, the Framers em-
powered Congress to grant discharges and expressly withheld 
this power from States. 
This historical evidence supports the idea that the 
constitutional concept of “uniform” was designed to enhance 
congressional power, not restrict it. As Justice Thomas noted in his 
dissent in Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, “the 
historical record thus refutes, rather than supports, the majority’s 
premise that the Framers placed paramount importance on the 
enactment of a nationally uniform bankruptcy law.”106 As validated 
 
 104. See infra notes 107 and 111. 
 105. See, e.g., Haines, supra note 95, at 168–70. 
 106. Cent. Va. Comty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 386–87 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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in Moyses, constitutional uniformity does not prevent Congress 
from incorporating non-uniform state laws into bankruptcy. In 
cases subsequent to Moyses, the Court confirmed that “geograph-
ical uniformity” is satisfied if certain defined groups of debtors or 
creditors receive uniform treatment. In fact, the Court upheld one 
challenged bankruptcy law that applied only in a statutorily defi-
ned geographic region as satisfying the geographical uniformity 
standard.107 Not surprisingly, the as-evolved doctrine has been 
soundly criticized by scholars.108 
 b. Calcification of permissive uniformity as norm. The notion that 
uniformity is ineffective as a substantive restriction on Congress’s 
ability to craft bankruptcy legislation has become increasingly 
unassailable. Outside of the exemptions context, Congress incor-
porating other non-uniform state laws and standards in bank-
ruptcy has been attacked on uniformity grounds. In each such case, 
the challenge has been unsuccessful. One high profile example, 
often cited by scholars in discussing uniformity, is Stellwagen v. 
Clum.109 In this case, the Court sanctified the incorporation of non-
uniform state laws defining fraudulent conveyances into the 
1898 Act. 
In Stellwagen, the Court raised the uniformity issue sua sponte 
and disposed of the bank’s argument summarily: 
Notwithstanding this requirement as to uniformity the 
bankruptcy acts of Congress may recognize the laws of the State 
in certain particulars, although such recognition may lead to 
 
 107. See infra notes 141–47 and accompanying text. 
 108. In a seminal article on this topic, Professor Judith Koffler called for a reexam-
ination and, ultimately, the abandonment of the doctrine of geographical uniformity. 
Koffler, supra note 59. Joining other voices, Professor Koffler provides a thoughtful 
criticism of the doctrine and essentially calls for the abandonment of the permissive 
conception of uniformity and a return to uniformity as a real limit on congressional action. 
She rightly observes that the Court’s treatment of uniform laws “comes dangerously close 
to suggesting that the constitutional language is surplusage.” Id. at 76. In the present 
Article, uniformity is treated not as surplusage, but as an enhancement of congressional 
power: a power, not a restriction. While no sober analysis of uniformity could now 
question whether Congress has the power to impose uniform laws on the states, some 
historical evidence suggests that this was precisely the concern during the time of the 
Convention. In the exemptions context, this elicits an obvious question: Does uniformity 
permit Congress to pass uniform bankruptcy exemptions that displace all state exemptions 
in bankruptcy? Congress has and does. 
 109. Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605 (1918). 
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different results in different States. For example, the Bankruptcy 
Act recognizes and enforces the laws of the States affecting 
dower, exemptions, the validity of mortgages, priorities of 
payment and the like. Such recognition in the application of state 
laws does not affect the constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Act, 
although in these particulars the operation of the act is not alike 
in all the States.110 
Largely due to this passage, Stellwagen is often cited for the 
proposition that incorporating non-uniform state laws is allow-
able under uniformity analysis. 111 
This deferential concept of uniformity has been applied in 
contexts other than in challenges to bankruptcy laws that incorpo-
rate non-uniform state laws.112 By way of example, uniformity was 
recently invoked to challenge the so-called eligibility test of § 707 
of the Code. As part of the 2005 Amendments, Congress enacted a 
new “means test” to determine whether debtors were eligible to 
file Chapter 7. The idea behind the amendment was to subject 
above-median-income debtors to a formula to determine whether 
essentially they had “too much” discretionary income to file 
Chapter 7. For debtors failing the test, the formula left Chapter 13, 
under which the debtor’s discretionary income is committed to 
bankruptcy for a period of thirty-six to sixty months, as the re-
maining consumer bankruptcy option. 
Under this Chapter 7 eligibility formula, the primary variable 
for eligibility is the median income for a similar household in the 
debtor’s state. Because median incomes vary state-to-state, similarly 
situated debtors in different states may have different eligibility 
outcomes. For instance, debtors with identical incomes, assets, 
and debts could find themselves in different positions: The debtor 
living in a high median income state may be eligible for Chapter 7, 
 
 110. Id. at 613. 
 111. Some scholars have criticized Stellwagen for failing to discriminate among types 
of state laws in terms, for instance, of whether those laws affect the size of the estate or 
simply the validity or priority of claims. See Koffler, supra note 59, at 71–72. 
 112. Daniel A. Austin, Bankruptcy and the Myth of “Uniform Laws,” 42 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 1081 (2012). Professor Austin explains that several factors contribute to the lack of 
uniformity in bankruptcy, including incorporation of state laws, the existence of local rules 
and procedures adopted by courts and trustees, and differing interpretations of key Code 
provisions among the courts. Id. 
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while the identical debtor in a low median income state may be 
ineligible for Chapter 7. 
In Schultz v. United States,113 the plaintiffs filed for bankruptcy 
under Chapter 13 in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
Eastern District of Tennessee while simultaneously filing a com-
plaint for declaratory judgment in the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Tennessee.114 The complaint for 
declaratory judgment alleged that the Bankruptcy Abuse Preven-
tion and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (hereinafter the Act or 
the BAPCPA) violated the uniformity clause set forth in Article I, 
Section 8, Clause 4 of the Constitution.115 The district court grant-
ed the government’s motion for summary judgment and the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.116 
As the Sixth Circuit noted, Congress enacted a new eligibility 
standard in BAPCPA to require debtors in higher income brackets 
to make more funds available for unsecured creditors.117 The Act 
requires debtors to demonstrate financial eligibility to file a 
Chapter 7 and allows a bankruptcy court to dismiss a debtor’s 
petition filed under Chapter 7 or to convert the Chapter 7 filing to 
a Chapter 13 filing if it appears that the “bankruptcy filing is an 
abuse of the bankruptcy proceedings.”118 
Under this test, the first step instructs the bankruptcy court to 
compare the debtor’s annualized current monthly income to the 
median family income of a similarly sized family in the debtor’s 
state of residence. If the debtor’s current monthly income is equal 
to or below the median, then the presumption of abuse does not 
arise. If, however, it exceeds the median, the Act directs the court 
to recalculate the debtor’s income by deducting certain necessary 
expenses specified by the statute. These reductions are derived 
from the national and local standards contained in the Internal 
Revenue Service’s Financial Analysis Handbook.119 
 
 113. Schultz v. United States, 529 F.3d 343 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 114. Id. at 347. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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The effect of the eligibility test was to push more above-
median-income debtors out of Chapter 7 liquidation and force 
them into Chapter 13 reorganization. The fulcrum point is the 
median income for the state in which debtor resides.120 
Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the United States challenging 
the five sections of the BAPCPA that utilize this eligibility “means 
test.”121 The plaintiffs asserted that the calculations, which are 
based in part on the state and county in which the debtor resides, 
are not uniform and thus are in violation of the Bankruptcy 
Clause.122 The plaintiffs had an income of approximately $84,000, 
which was above the median family income for a family of five in 
Tennessee but below the median family income in several other 
states.123 This impacted the expense deductions the plaintiffs could 
claim under the BAPCPA.124 The district court concluded that the 
uniformity requirement set forth in the Constitution “does not 
proscribe different results in different states because of state law 
variations.”125 Thus, the district court granted the government’s 
motion for summary judgment.126 
In response to the [Plaintiff’s] argument that the BAPCPA 
amendments are unconstitutional because they create variations 
in different states based on federal instead of state law, the 
district court explained that there is “no principled reason for 
concluding that variations resulting from federal statistics create 
unconstitutional non-uniformity, whereas variations resulting 
from state law do not.” The court concluded that “[d]isposable 
income might vary from place to place, but it is based on 
uniformly calculated national statistics. The variations in the 
results produced by these statistics are of no constitutional 
consequence.”127 
Plaintiffs appealed to the Sixth Circuit.128 
 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 348. 
 122. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4). 
 123. Id. (for example, Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Maryland, New Hamp-
shire, and New Jersey). 
 124. Id. at 349. 
 125. Id. (citing Schultz v. United States, 369 B.R. 349, 352 (E.D. Tenn. 2007)). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. (quoting Schultz, 369 B.R. at 353 (internal citations omitted)). 
 128. Id. 
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The main question resolved by the Sixth Circuit was whether 
the BAPCPA provision incorporating non-uniform state median 
income levels is a “uniform Law on the subject of bankruptcy.”129 
“The Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution grants Congress the 
power to ‘establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of 
Bankruptcies throughout the United States.’”130 Quoting Chief 
Justice Marshall, the Sixth Circuit noted that “Congress is not 
authorized merely to pass laws, the operation of which shall be 
uniform, but instead to establish uniform laws on the subject 
throughout the United States.”131 The plaintiffs in this case argued 
that the scheme adopted by Congress, which takes into account a 
debtor’s income compared to the median income of a particular 
state, violates the Bankruptcy Clause.132 Specifically, the scheme 
results in debtors receiving different relief based on the state or 
country in which they reside.133 The concept of personal 
uniformity is implicit in the plaintiff’s argument—that is, the 
notion that the laws should apply to all debtors in the same way 
regardless of where the debtor resides.134 However, the Supreme 
Court has “consistently described the Bankruptcy Clause’s uni-
formity requirement as ‘geographical, and not personal . . . .’”135 
This requirement is “satisfied when existing obligations of a 
debtor are treated alike by the bankruptcy administration 
throughout the country regardless of the State in which the 
bankruptcy court sits . . . .”136 
This geographical uniformity requirement does not prohibit 
different effects in various states due to variations in state law, 
provided that the federal law applies uniformly among the classes 
of debtors.137 Quoting Moyses, the court noted that “[t]he general 
operation of [a] law is uniform although it may result in certain 
 
 129. Id. at 350. 
 130. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4). 
 131. Id. (quoting Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 193–94 (1819)). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 350–51. 
 135. Id. at 351 (quoting Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188 (1902)). 
 136. Id. (quoting Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 172 
(1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
 137. Id. 
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particulars differently in different states.”138 Congress may pass 
non-uniform laws to address “geographically isolated problems” 
provided the law operates “uniformly upon a given class of 
creditors and debtors.”139 The uniformity requirement “does not 
deny Congress power to take into account differences that exist 
between different parts of the country, and to fashion legislation 
to resolve geographically isolated problems . . . appl[ied] equally 
to all creditors and debtors.”140 
The Sixth Circuit concluded that the Chapter 7 eligibility 
provision of BAPCPA is a constitutionally “uniform law.”141 Thus, 
Congress could constitutionally distinguish among different 
classes of debtors, and this may be accomplished “through the 
incorporation of varying state laws.”142 BAPCPA employs a means 
test that utilizes income calculations in accordance with the IRS 
Handbook’s national and local standards.143 As the court stated,  
BAPCPA is uniform in form: all debtors whose income is above 
the median family income are treated alike, as are all debtors 
whose income falls below. The resulting differences based on the 
state in which the debtor resides are analytically indistinguish-
able from the differences resulting from the incorporation of 
various state laws.144  
The Bankruptcy Clause does not prohibit Congress from 
considering the differences that exist between various parts of 
the country.145 
2. Limits of permissive uniformity: discriminatory regionalism through 
“private laws” 
Although the constitutional call for “uniform Laws” has settled 
into the highly deferential doctrine of geographic uniformity, 
 
 138. Id. (“Geographic uniformity in this context, the Court observed, was satisfied 
‘when the trustee takes in each state whatever would have been available if the bankrupt 
law had not been passed.’”) (quoting Moyses, 186 U.S. at 190). 
 139. Id. (citing Blanchette v. Conn. Gen. Ins. Corps., 419 U.S. 102 (1974)). 
 140. Id. (quoting Blanchette, 419 U.S. at 159, 160) (internal citations omitted)). 
 141. Id. at 352. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 353. 
 145. Id. 
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Congress does not enjoy complete discretion in enacting bank-
ruptcy laws to its liking. The point at which the permissive 
construction yields to uniformity as a restriction on congressional 
action is illustrated by two railroad cases: (i) Regional Rail 
Reorganization Act Cases from 1974 and (ii) Railway Labor Executives 
Association v. Gibbons from 1982 (the Rail Act Cases). 146 
In the Rail Act Cases, the Court upheld against a uniformity 
challenge a bankruptcy law147 that applied to a geographically 
exclusive area—”the midwest and northeast region.”148 The Rail 
Act had been passed in response to a congressional finding that 
then-existing bankruptcy law could not adequately address a 
transportation crisis precipitated by eight railroads from that 
geographic region entering bankruptcy. Congress created the Rail 
Act to allow these railroads to reorganize more expeditiously 
under a single entity, a Conrail. The Rail Act was challenged on 
the basis that it violated geographic uniformity by applying to 
only a specific statutorily defined geographic region. 
Largely avoiding a discussion of Moyses, the 8–1 majority 
opinion acknowledged the “surface appeal” of the argument that 
the Rail Act facially violated geographic uniformity.149  In rejecting 
this argument, however, the Court determined that the 
Bankruptcy Clause uniformity challenge “overlooks the flexibility 
inherent in the constitutional provision.”150 Invoking this 
“inherent flexibility,” the Court upheld the Rail Act on two bases: 
(1) that no railroads outside the defined region were in bank-
ruptcy and (2) that the Act operated uniformly with respect to 
all creditors.151 
In a more recent case and the sole instance in which the Court 
found a violation of uniformity, the limit of the permissive norm 
 
 146. Reg’l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974); Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n 
v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982). 
 147. Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 (Rail Act), Pub. L. No. 93-236, 87 Stat. 
985 (1974) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 701–797m (West Supp. 1982)). 
 148. Id. at § 701. 
 149. Justice Douglas provided the lone voice in the wilderness, by noting in his 
dissent that the Court had “never dreamed of allowing debtors in the same class and their 
creditors to be treated more leniently in one region than in another.” Reg’l Rail, 419 U.S. at 
102, 184 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 150. Reg’l Rail, 419 U.S. at 158. 
 151. Id. at 156–61. 
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of uniformity was illustrated when the Court struck down a 
bankruptcy law that applied to a single debtor in Gibbons.152 In 
short, the Court held that while uniformity permitted Congress to 
make geographical distinctions based on regions, a bankruptcy 
law “must at least apply uniformly to a defined class of 
debtors.”153 With little analysis, the Court observed that “[a] 
bankruptcy law . . . confined as it is to the affairs of one named 
debtor can hardly be considered uniform.”154 
B. State Bankruptcy-Specific Exemptions Are 
Constitutionally “Uniform” 
Congress can delegate exemptions in bankruptcy to the states. 
In Moyses, the Court provided a specific sanctification of Congress 
delegating exemptions in bankruptcy to the states. While the 
doctrine of geographic uniformity has been roundly criticized, 
cases subsequent to Moyses essentially eviscerated the notion that 
uniformity is a meaningful restriction on congressional action in 
the realm of bankruptcy legislation. The Rail Act Cases called into 
focus whether and to what extent facial geographical disuni-
formity is permissible, as the act applied only to certain areas of 
the country. The Court relied on the “inherent flexibility” of the 
Bankruptcy Clause and deferred to Congress when it perceived 
legislation was procedurally uniform and free from any hint of 
discriminatory regionalism. Though the challenged act applied 
exclusively to a defined region, application of the law was in fact 
agnostic to geography, as there were no bankrupt railroads 
outside the defined region at the time of the act. By contrast, 
Gibbons marked the extreme of the regionalism spectrum, in both 
form and application—a bankruptcy act applying to a single 
named railroad company and excluding other railroad companies 
in bankruptcy at the time of the act. 
Since in Moyses the Court upheld delegating exemptions to 
states in bankruptcy under the 1898 Act, how is the existing 
concurrent system—including the opt-out—different, and do 
 
 152. Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 457. 
 153. Id. at 473. 
 154. Id. 
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those differences dictate a result contrary to Moyses? How does 
the post-Moyses distillation of uniformity as a failing source of 
restriction on Congress’s power factor into the issue? 
The most compelling uniformity argument against state 
bankruptcy-specific exemptions being allowed under § 522 relies 
on language from Moyses elaborating the standard for geographic 
uniformity. In upholding the provision of the 1898 Act delegating 
bankruptcy exemptions to the states, the Moyses Court explained 
that a bankruptcy exemptions scheme “is, in the constitutional 
sense, uniform throughout the United States, when the [bank-
ruptcy] trustee takes in each [s]tate whatever would have been 
available to the creditors if the bankrupt[cy] law had not been 
passed.”155 A surface application of this rule to any state 
bankruptcy-specific scheme suggests constitutional infirmity. 
Under state laws that provide more generous exemptions in 
bankruptcy, a trustee would take less in bankruptcy than a 
creditor would take but for bankruptcy. In essence, the actual 
purpose of proposed state reforms is this result: allowing a debtor 
to keep the amounts and types of property to enable a fresh start. 
The surface application of this rule from Moyses fails, however, 
for several reasons.156 First and foremost, the notion of “uniform” 
has expanded since Moyses, and that expansion demonstrates that 
the delegation of exemptions policy in § 522 can constitutionally 
permit state bankruptcy-specific exemptions. In 1902, when Moyses 
was decided, the doctrine of geographic uniformity was announ-
ced. The fundamental principle of this doctrine was that the 
uniformity required by the Bankruptcy Clause is geographic and 
not personal. The Moyses Court specifically acknowledged that 
geographic uniformity permitted different outcomes in bankruptcy 
in different states. Indeed, by completely delegating bankruptcy 
 
 155. Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 190 (1902). 
 156. A careful reading of Moyses calls into question whether the quoted language 
prohibits state laws that result in the trustee taking a different amount in bankruptcy than a 
creditor would take under state law but for bankruptcy. The Court explained that an 
exemptions system that adheres to this standard is constitutionally uniform. Absent, 
however, was any explicit determination that an exemptions system failing this standard 
would be unconstitutional. In this sense, the “trustee takes same as creditor” requirement 
can be viewed as sufficient but not necessary to establish constitutionality of a given 
exemptions system. At a minimum, this practical construction of the rule calls into question 
the efficacy of this language of Moyses as fatal to state bankruptcy-specific exemptions. 
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exemptions policy to the states, the 1898 Act essentially required 
different outcomes in different states. Those outcomes were deter-
mined by the state in which a debtor filed bankruptcy. 
A strong case exists that applying Moyses to § 522 would 
invalidate the federal exemptions, not the opt-out provision.157 
Recall that a bankruptcy exemptions scheme “is, in the consti-
tutional sense, uniform throughout the United States, when the 
[bankruptcy] trustee takes in each state whatever would have 
been available to the creditor if the bankrupt[cy] law had not been 
passed.” Strict application of this rule would strike down the 
federal exemptions listed in § 522(d). Had the bankruptcy law, in 
this case the Code, not been passed, what the trustee takes would 
be determined solely and exclusively by state general exemptions 
laws. Hence, to the extent the federal exemptions conflict with the 
general state exemptions, Moyses would view the federal exemp-
tions as lacking constitutional uniformity. 
Since Moyses, the doctrine of geographical uniformity has been 
confirmed to be impotent as a means to challenge bankruptcy 
legislation. At each opportunity, the Court has consistently and 
substantially eroded any restrictions imposed by the doctrine. 
Bankruptcy laws can now apply to statutorily defined regions of 
the country to the exclusion of other regions. During this expan-
sion, the “geography” component of uniformity has been debased 
and essentially replaced with the requirement that bankruptcy 
laws be procedurally uniform. Bankruptcy laws are not consti-
tutionally uniform if they treat defined sets of creditors even-
handedly. Alternatively, uniformity is satisfied if defined sets of 
debtors are treated in a procedurally uniform manner. 
The Court has signaled this deferential, indeed permissive, 
conception of uniformity through pronouncements not essential 
to holdings in several cases. Most notably, the Court in the Rail 
Act Cases took a significant step toward reading the restrictiveness 
of uniformity out of the Bankruptcy Clause altogether by 
 
 157. Several scholars have criticized the as-evolved doctrine of geographic uniformity 
as incoherent. I do not defend the coherence of the doctrine. Instead, I use the as-evolved 
doctrine to support a conclusion that state bankruptcy exemptions would survive a 
uniformity challenge. 
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announcing the “flexibility inherent.”158 While striking down a 
single-entity bankruptcy law as violating uniformity, the Court 
took occasion to continue to signal the deferential—even 
permissive—conception of uniformity. 
C. State Bankruptcy-Specific Exemptions Are Not Preempted 
Under the Supremacy Clause 
Although constitutional uniformity might not proscribe state 
bankruptcy-specific exemptions, what about the argument that 
such exemptions are “bankruptcy laws” that are preempted under 
the Supremacy Clause? The argument can be facially appealing. 
The Bankruptcy Clause grants authority to Congress to pass 
bankruptcy laws, and it exercised that authority by enacting the 
Bankruptcy Code. How can state laws that apply only in 
bankruptcy not be preempted? 
 The primary preemption argument against the concurrent 
exemption scheme draws strength from, and ascribes constitu-
tionally significant meaning to, the detailed federal exemptions 
contained in § 522. Congress has determined what exemptions 
should be in bankruptcy. Preemption proponents urge that state 
exemptions that are “less generous”159 than the federal counter-
parts are preempted, since Congress has determined appropriate 
exemption levels in bankruptcy. For example, concluding that 
California’s bankruptcy-specific exemption was unconstitutional, 
a bankruptcy court in 2008 determined that Congress had 
preempted state bankruptcy-only exemption schemes that were 
inconsistent with § 522.160 The court relied on an oft-quoted 
articulation of the rule of field preemption: “Congress’s intent to 
supersede state law altogether may be found from a ‘scheme of 
federal regulation . . . so pervasive as to make reasonable the 
 
 158. See Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605 (1918). 
 159. This preemption argument essentially requires a standard for determining 
whether a challenged state exemption scheme is, in fact, “less generous.” States with 
high or unlimited homestead exemptions are certainly more generous to bankrupt 
homeowners than federal exemptions allow. How would this factor into determining 
whether the state’s exemptions are “generous” enough? This Article recasts the question 
as one of the functionality of exemptions, rather than the degree to which they are 
generous. See infra Section IV.A. 
 160. In re Regevig, 389 B.R. 736, 740 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2008). 
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inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement 
it.’”161 In the absence of Congress providing pervasive regu-
lation162 in a field, state laws remain unconstitutional to the extent 
they conflict with federal law under the “conflict preemption” 
doctrine. The bankruptcy court determined that in § 522 Congress 
had “pervasively defined the exemptions that a state may permit a 
debtor to claim only in a bankruptcy case.”163 This reasoning 
appears to ignore how the opt-out provision delegates to states 
the ultimate exemptions decision. 
Given this context, should the federal opt-out provision (and 
resulting state laws) be subject to preemption challenges? The 
short answer is “no.” This is especially true for any state 
undertaking the “meaningful review” process envisioned by this 
Article and the Model. 
1. The genesis of preemption is state interference with the purpose and 
objectives of bankruptcy law 
The beginning of any bankruptcy preemption issue is Perez v. 
Campbell.164 In Perez, the petitioners challenged the constitution-
ality of an Arizona law that permitted the state to withhold a 
driver’s license conditioned on payment of claim related to an 
automobile accident when that claim had been discharged in 
bankruptcy.165 More particularly, petitioners asserted the Arizona 
 
 161. Id. (quoting Sherwood Partners, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 394 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
 162. The Court offers a succinct, yet more thorough, description of field preemption in 
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission: 
Absent explicit pre-emptive language, Congress’ [sic] intent to supersede state 
law altogether may be found from a “‘scheme of federal regulation . . . so 
pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room to 
supplement it,’ because ‘the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the 
federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to 
preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject,’ or because ‘the object 
sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of obligations 
imposed by it may reveal the same purpose.’”  
461 U.S. 190, 203–04 (1983) (quoting Fid. Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass’n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 
141, 153 (1982)). 
 163. Regevig, 389 B.R. at 740. 
 164. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971). 
 165. In 1965, the petitioners were involved in an automobile accident in Tucson, and 
the automobile was not covered by liability insurance at the time of the accident. Id. The 
driver of the second car was the minor daughter of the Pinkertons, who sued the 
petitioners in state court. Id. The petitioners confessed judgment, and a judgment order was 
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law’s requirement that the judgment be paid in order for the 
petitioner’s driver’s license to be reinstated directly conflicted 
with the Bankruptcy Act and was, therefore, in violation of the 
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.166 Stated differently, the 
issue in Perez was whether the state has the power to  interfere 
with the bankruptcy discharge of an automobile accident tort 
judgment  “insofar as such repayment may be enforced by the 
withholding of driving privileges [of the debtor] by the State.”167 
The Court articulated a two-step process for determining 
whether a state statute conflicts with a federal statute and thus is 
invalid under the Supremacy Clause.168 First, the Court must 
ascertain the construction of the two statutes.169 Next, the Court 
must determine whether the two statutes are in fact in conflict.170 
 
entered against them in the amount of $2,425.98 plus court costs. Id. The petitioners filed a 
voluntary bankruptcy petition in 1967. Id. The District Court entered orders discharging the 
petitioners from all debts and claims against their estates, including the Pinkerton 
judgment. Id. at 639. While the Court noted that only one provision of the Arizona Motor 
Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act (“Arizona Act”) is relevant to the issue at hand, the Court 
described the statutory scheme overall to give context to the statute at issue. Id. at 639–42. 
The substantive provisions of the Arizona Act begin in Article 3, which requires those 
involved in accidents to post financial security. Id. It furthermore provides that anyone 
who unlawfully fails to report an accident is subject to the suspension of his or her license. 
Id. Article 4 addresses the suspension of licenses and registrations for nonpayment of 
judgments, and this is the only provision of the Arizona Act at issue in Perez. Id. Under the 
Arizona Act, it is only when the judgment debtor in an automobile accident lawsuit fails to 
respond to a judgment that has been entered against him that “he must overcome two 
hurdles in order to regain his driving privileges.” Id. at 637. When a judgment has 
remained unsatisfied for sixty days after entry of the judgment, the state court clerk must 
forward a certified copy of the judgment to the superintendent. The state court clerk in this 
case complied with this requirement, and the petitioners were notified that their drivers’ 
licenses and registration were suspended. Article 4 further provides that a “discharge in 
bankruptcy following the rendering of any such judgment shall not relieve the judgment 
debtor from any of the requirements of this article.” Id. 
 166. Perez, 402 U.S. at 643. 
 167. Id. (“What is at issue here is the power of a State to include as part of this 
comprehensive enactment designed to secure compensation for automobile accident 
victims a section providing that a discharge in bankruptcy of the automobile accident tort 
judgment shall have no effect on the judgment debtor’s obligation to repay the judgment 
creditor, at least insofar as such repayment may be enforced by the withholding of driving 
privileges by the State.”). 
 168. Id. at 644. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
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As noted in Perez, the Arizona statute at issue had been 
construed by Arizona courts.171 The Supreme Court of Arizona 
determined, in Schecter v. Killingsworth, that the Arizona Act’s 
principal purpose is the protection of the public using the 
highways “from financial hardship which may result from the use 
of automobiles by financially irresponsible persons.”172 The sole 
purpose of the Arizona Act, according to the United States 
Supreme Court, was to provide leverage to aid in collecting 
damages from drivers who either admit that they are at fault or 
are found to be at fault by a court.173 
The construction of the Bankruptcy Act was clear:174 
This Court on numerous occasions has stated that “[o]ne of the 
primary purposes of the bankruptcy act [sic]” is to give debtors 
“a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, 
unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexist-
ing debt.”175 
Thus, Congress clearly intended that the “new opportunity” 
referenced above include “freedom from most kinds of pre-
existing tort judgments.”176 
The Court noted that “[w]ith the construction of both statutes 
clearly established,” it would move to the constitutional question 
of whether a state statute that protects judgment creditors from 
drivers who are financially irresponsible conflicts with a federal 
statute that provides debtors a fresh start.177 The Court’s analysis 
referenced Chief Justice Marshall’s 1824 statement in Gibbons v. 
Ogden that actions of the state legislatures that interfere with or 
 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. (citing Schecter v. Killingsworth, 380 P.2d 136 (Ariz. 1963)). 
 173. Id. at 646–47. 
 174. Id. at 648. 
 175. Id. (alteration in original) (citing Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)); 
accord, e.g., Harris v. Zion’s Sav. Bank & Tr. Co., 317 U.S. 447, 451 (1943); Stellwagen v. 
Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 617 (1918); Williams v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554–
55 (1915). 
 176. Id. at 648. 
 177. Id. at 649 (“With the construction of both statutes clearly established, we proceed 
immediately to the constitutional question whether a state statute that protects judgment 
creditors from ‘financially irresponsible persons’ is in conflict with a federal statute that 
gives discharged debtors a new start ‘unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of 
preexisting debt.’”). 
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are contrary to the laws of Congress are invalid under the 
Supremacy Clause.178 Justice Black similarly wrote the following 
in Hines v. Davidowitz: 
[W]hile “[t]his Court, in considering the validity of state laws in 
the light of treaties or federal laws touching the same subject, 
ha[d] made use of the following expressions: conflicting; 
contrary to; occupying the field; repugnance; difference; irre-
concilability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment; and inter-
ference[,] . . . [i]n the final analysis,” our function is to determine 
whether a challenged state statute “stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objec-
tives of Congress.”179 
Since the Court’s decision in Hines, it has followed this 
articulation of the meaning of the Supremacy Clause.180 
The Perez Court then addressed two previous cases that, 
despite the standard set forth by the Court in Hines, “ignored this 
controlling principle.”181 In Kesler v. Department of Public Safety of 
Utah, the Court had addressed the issue of whether Utah’s Motor 
Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act conflicted with the Bankruptcy 
Act and was thus invalid under the Supremacy Clause.182 The 
Perez Court, in addressing the Kesler decision, noted that “[t]he 
Court in Kesler conceded that Utah’s financial responsibility law 
left ‘the bankrupt to some extent burdened by the discharged 
debt,’ made ‘it more probable that the debt will be paid despite 
the discharge,’ and thereby made ‘some inroad . . . on the 
consequences of bankruptcy.’”183 Essentially, Utah’s statute 
“frustrated Congress’ [sic] policy of giving discharged debtors a 
 
 178. Id. (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 6 (1824)). 
 179. Id. (second, third, and fourth alterations in original) (quoting Hines v. 
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
 180. Id. See, e.g., Nash v. Fla. Indus. Comm’n, 389 U.S. 235, 240 (1967); Sears, Roebuck 
& Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964); Colo. Anti-Discrimination Comm’n v. Cont’l 
Air Lines, Inc., 372 U.S. 714, 722 (1963) (dictum); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962); Hill 
v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 542–43 (1945); Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 
176 (1942). 
 181. Perez, 402 U.S. at 650. 
 182. Kesler v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety of Utah, 369 U.S. 153, 154–56 (1962) (overruled in 
part by Perez, 402 U.S. 637). 
 183. Perez, 402 U.S. at 650 (internal citations omitted). 
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new start.”184 Despite this conclusion, the Kesler Court upheld the 
statute, claiming that the statute was designed to enforce a policy 
against irresponsible driving and was not aimed at helping 
creditors collect debts owed to them.185 
The Kesler Court did not focus on the effect of the Utah 
statute. Rather it concluded that because the purpose of the Utah 
statute was to promote safety on Utah’s highways and not to 
circumvent the Bankruptcy Act, the statute did not conflict with 
the Act.186 The dissent, on the other hand, reached the opposite 
conclusion.187 The Kesler dissent stated that, while the purpose of 
the Utah statute may not have been to circumvent the 
Bankruptcy Act, the “’plain and inevitable effect’” of the Utah 
statute “‘[was] to create a powerful weapon for collection of a 
debt from which [the] bankrupt [had] been released by federal 
law.”188 Upholding such a statute, according to the dissent, 
would allow the States to impair an important policy “embodied 
in [this Nation’s] bankruptcy laws.”189 
The Court’s previous decision in Reitz,190 according to the Perez 
Court, similarly reached the wrong conclusion.191 The Reitz Court 
focused on the purpose of the state statute at issue, rather than the 
fact that the statute “frustrated the operation of the Bankruptcy 
Act . . . .”192 The New York statute at issue in Reitz provided for 
the suspension of the operator’s license and registration if a 
judgment against him for injury to another person or property 
resulting from operation of a motor vehicle was not paid within 
fifteen days of judgment.193 The Reitz Court noted that the purpose 
 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. (“Utah’s statute, in short, frustrated Congress’ [sic] policy of giving dischar-
ged debtors a new start. But the Kesler majority was not concerned by this frustration. In 
upholding the statute, the majority opinion did not look to the effect of the legislation but 
simply asserted that the statute was ‘not an Act for the Relief of Mulcted Creditors,’ and 
was ‘not designed to aid collection of debts but to enforce a policy against irresponsible 
driving . . . .’” (internal citation omitted)). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. (quoting Kesler v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety of Utah, 369 U.S. 153, 183 (1962)). 
 189. Id. (quoting Kesler, 369 U.S. at 185). 
 190. Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33, 36 (1941) (overruled in part by Perez, 402 U.S. 637). 
 191. Perez, 402 U.S. at 651. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Reitz, 314 U.S. at 35. 
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of the New York statute would be frustrated if drivers were 
permitted to escape the application of the statute simply by filing 
a voluntary bankruptcy petition.194 
The penalty which [the New York statute] imposes for injury 
due to careless driving is not for the protection of the creditor 
merely, but to enforce a public policy that irresponsible drivers 
shall not, with impunity, be allowed to injure their fellows. The 
scheme of the legislation would be frustrated if the reckless 
driver were permitted to escape its provisions by the simple 
expedient of voluntary bankruptcy, and, accordingly, the legis-
lature declared that a discharge in bankruptcy should not inter-
fere with the operation of the statute. Such legislation is not in 
derogation of the Bankruptcy Act. Rather it is an enforcement of 
permissible state policy touching highway safety.195 
Thus, the majority in Reitz focused on the fact that the statute’s 
purpose was aimed at creating safer highways rather than im-
pairing the Bankruptcy Act.196 The dissent, however, argued that 
the New York statute circumvented the Bankruptcy Act and 
effectively ensured that bankruptcy “[was not] the sanctuary for 
hapless debtors which Congress intended.”197 
After analyzing the Kesler and Reitz decisions, the Perez Court 
reiterated its position that Kesler and Reitz are no longer good 
law.198 Applying a doctrine that focuses on the purpose of the state 
statute at issue rather than its effect would be at odds with nearly 
all previous decisions regarding the Supremacy Clause.199 In addi-
tion, “such a doctrine would enable state legislatures to nullify 
nearly all unwanted federal legislation by simply publishing a 
legislative committee report articulating some state interest or 
policy—other than frustration of the federal objective—that would 
be tangentially furthered by the proposed state law.”200 The Court 
 
 194. Perez, 402 U.S. at 651 (citing Reitz, 314 U.S. at 37). 
 195. Id. (quoting Reitz, 314 U.S. at 37). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Reitz, 314 U.S. at 41). 
 198. Id. at 651–52 (“We can no longer adhere to the aberrational doctrine of Kesler and 
Reitz that state law may frustrate the operation of federal law as long as the state legislature 
in passing its law had some purpose in mind other than one of frustration.”). 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 652. 
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acknowledged that it is possible to make an argument that Kessler 
and Reitz are confined to bankruptcy cases or highway safety 
cases, but the Court quickly dismissed this argument by noting 
that there is no reason as to why the States should have “broader 
power to nullify federal law in these fields than in others.”201 As a 
result, the Court held that Kesler and Reitz have no authoritative 
effect because they are inconsistent with the application of the 
Supremacy Clause.202 
Even accepting the analysis of the Supremacy Clause prom-
ulgated in Kesler and Reitz—that is, looking at the purpose of the 
law rather than the effect of the law—those decisions were not 
dispositive in Perez.203 In both Kesler and Reitz the courts assumed, 
without supporting case law, that the purpose of the laws was to 
deter irresponsible driving rather than to provide relief to 
creditors.204 Here, the Arizona Supreme Court declared that the 
purpose of the Arizona statute was to protect the public from 
financial hardship “resulting from involvement in traffic accidents 
with uninsured motorists unable to respond to a judgment.”205 
The Kesler Court declared that the purpose of the Utah statute was 
not to aid in the collection of debts and therefore could be upheld, 
although the source of support for this declaration is “unclear.”206 
In Perez, the Court noted that the Arizona statute has an express 
purpose of protecting judgment creditors from financial hardship 
by giving them a tool to force bankrupts to pay their debts despite 
their discharge in bankruptcy, which is “precisely the sort of 
statute that Kesler would have stricken down . . . .”207 
Whereas the Acts in Kesler and Reitz had the effect of frustrating 
federal law but had, the Court said, no such purpose, the 
Arizona Act has both that effect and that purpose. Believing as 
 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. (“Thus, we conclude that Kesler and Reitz can have no authoritative effect to 
the extent they are inconsistent with the controlling principle that any state legislation 
which frustrates the full effectiveness of federal law is rendered invalid by the 
Supremacy Clause.”). 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 652–53. 
 205. Id. at 654 (quoting Schecter v. Killingsworth, 380 P.2d 136, 140 (1963)). 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
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we do that Kesler and Reitz are not in harmony with sound 
constitutional principle, they certainly should not be extended to 
cover this new and distinguishable case.208 
Thus, the Court in Perez held the Arizona Safety Responsibility 
Act invalid under the Constitution.209 
2. State bankruptcy-specific exemptions further, rather than interfere or 
conflict with, the purposes and objectives of bankruptcy law 
Against this backdrop of preemption jurisprudence, is it likely 
that state bankruptcy-specific exemptions are repugnant to 
Supremacy? Does providing debtors in bankruptcy “more gen-
erous” exemption rights than debtors outside bankruptcy interfere 
with congressional objectives and purposes? 
In thinking about preemption in this context, it is tempting 
to draw on conventional notions of cooperative federalism.210 
 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Essentially, cooperative federalism programs allow the state agencies to “step 
into the shoes of the federal agency” in order to enact federal regulations. Philip J. Weiser, 
Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1692, 1696 (2001). One of the most imperative features of a cooperative federalism 
program is the careful balance struck between total preemption by the federal statute and 
“uncoordinated federal and state action in distinct regulatory spheres (a dual federalism).” 
Id. at 1697. The cooperative federalism model is a blend between these two extremes. Id. 
Under the cooperative federalism approach, Congress and federal agencies are charged 
with constructing the basic framework that defines the state agencies’ authority, as well as 
determining a uniform minimum standard applicable to all states. Id. The state agencies are 
then given the power to supplement this framework. Id. at 1698. Generally speaking, 
cooperative federalism encourages the states to use discretion in determining how best to 
implement the federal laws, thereby allowing for diversity in the federal regulatory 
program. Id. at 1698 (“In particular, there are at least three related reasons why the federal 
government has decided to promote diversity in federal regulatory regimes: (1) to allow 
states to tailor federal regulatory programs to local conditions; (2) to promote competition 
within a federal regulatory framework; and (3) to permit experimentation with different 
approaches that may assist in determining an optimal regulatory strategy.”). Congress has 
continued to endorse cooperative federalism throughout the years, beginning in the 1970s 
with the passage of key environmental statutes. Sarah C. Rispin, Cooperative Federalism and 
Constructive Waiver of State Sovereign Immunity, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639, 1642 (2003). These 
federal statutes ultimately rely on state agencies to enact local regulations that comport 
with national standards. Id. at 1643. An example of such a scheme is the Clean Air Act, 
which sets national ambient air quality standards but allows the states to determine how 
best to reach such standards. Id. at 1643. Other cooperative federalism schemes include 
Medicaid, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Public Utility Regulatory Policies 
Act, and the Telecom Act. Id. at 1642–43. “By having the local government bodies 
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Cooperative federalism assumes and requires uniform federal 
standards being enforced by state agencies. If the specific 
exemptions listed in § 522(d) are the uniform standards, then 
state action adopting standards (i.e., exemptions) different from 
the federal standards could be preempted. This analysis com-
pletely ignores the opt-out provision. Congress made a deliberate 
choice to permit states to preempt the federal exemptions by 
opting out of them. Traditional concepts of cooperative federalism 
simply don’t fit. Attacks on the constitutionality of the opt-out 
provision have been uniformly unsuccessful. As a result, the 
treatment of exemptions under the Bankruptcy Code provide an 
unfamiliar structure. 
The concurrent exemptions system presents, then, the 
somewhat unique case of Congress adopting a uniform standard 
and authorizing a state to preempt that standard with its own. By 
providing the opt-out, Congress has removed the federal exemp-
tions as uniform standards per se. Instead, the specific federal 
exemptions serve two functions: (i) providing an alternative set of 
standards available to each state and (ii) signaling lineaments that 
Congress deems important for exemptions to fulfill the “fresh 
start” objective. 
Because Congress has provided explicit authority for states to 
pass controlling exemptions standards, preemption under a 
cooperative federalism analysis is likely inapplicable—which 
leaves courts with the traditional bankruptcy preemption analysis 
from Perez. 
Perhaps most critically, the Court in Perez confirmed  the 
construction of the Bankruptcy Act.211 “This Court on numerous 
occasions has stated that ‘[o]ne of the primary purposes of the 
bankruptcy act’ [sic] is to give debtors ‘a new opportunity in life 
and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and 
 
implement federal regulation locally, these statutes preserve a role for the states in areas 
that the federal political branches have decided it is in the nation’s best interest to regulate 
according to a central design.” Id. at 1643. 
 211. Construing the 1898 Act. All evidence suggests that the 1978 Act continues these 
fundamental purposes. See supra notes 41–49 and accompanying text. 
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discouragement of preexisting debt.’”212 States enacting targeted 
exemptions could simply be viewed as picking up the federal 
baton by invigorating the “fresh start” through more appropriate 
exemptions in bankruptcy. 
IV. A MODEL FOR STATE BANKRUPTCY EXEMPTIONS REFORM 
Michigan stands as one of only two states213 that have passed a 
somewhat comprehensive bankruptcy-specific exemptions scheme. 
Perhaps ironically, the Michigan experiment was actually a 
modest response, resulting from an opaque political compromise, 
to a bolder call for broader general exemption reform. In fact, the 
Michigan reforms were “bankruptcy-specific” almost by accident 
as an apparent result of the legislative trading process.214 
This Article does not proffer Michigan as a model for other 
states to follow. Instead, the Michigan case is an example of state 
legislative reform effort that resulted in actual legislation: 
bankruptcy-specific exemptions becoming law. Indeed, the central 
features of the Michigan scheme fail to address the Fresh Start 
Function of exemptions in bankruptcy. The reform, while in some 
sense “comprehensive,” did not result from a process and model 
resembling those proposed herein. 
The most noteworthy feature of Michigan’s reform is the 
substantial expansion of the homestead exemption for individuals 
in bankruptcy.215 Outside of bankruptcy, a homeowner in Michigan 
can protect $3,500 in home equity. A debtor filing bankruptcy can 
protect $30,000 with the possibility of expanding that dollar 
amount to $45,000.216 Categories of property other than homestead 
are also treated differently under the Michigan reform.217 
 
 212. Perez, 402 U.S. at 648 (citing Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)); 
accord, e.g., Harris v. Zion’s Sav. Bank & Tr. Co., 317 U.S. 447, 451 (1943); Stellwagen v. Clum, 
245 U.S. 605, 617 (1918); Williams v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554–55 (1915). 
 213. The other state is Delaware. 
 214. See, e.g., In re Sassak, 426 B.R. 680, 687–89 (E.D. Mich. 2010). 
 215. See Thomas R. Morris, The Michigan Exemption Initiative, MICH. BUS. L.J., 
Summer 2011, at 14; Thomas R. Morris, The History and Future of Michigan Debtor Exemp-
tions, MICH. BUS. L.J., Summer 2010, at 57 [hereinafter The History and Future of Michigan 
Debtor Exemptions]. 
 216. The History and Future of Michigan Debtor Exemptions, supra note 215. 
 217. Id. 
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Perhaps the most notable contribution of the Michigan reform is 
that it survived Uniformity and Supremacy challenges.218 The 
importance of this survival cannot be overstated: A state-enacted 
bankruptcy-specific exemption that applied only to residents 
filing bankruptcy was determined to be constitutional by the 
Sixth Circuit.219 
The Michigan reform and its vindication by the Sixth Circuit 
provide a powerful impetus for reform efforts by other states. 
Reforms resulting from the “meaningful review” process de-
signed to serve the Fresh Start Function will stand on more solid 
constitutional ground than the Michigan reform, as those reforms 
were prompted by generalized concerns of “updating” and 
“liberalizing” exemptions. The Michigan reform resulted from 
opaque political wrangling and compromises, rather than from a 
deliberate process of enacting bankruptcy-specific exemptions for 
the express purpose of having exemptions designed to serve the 
Fresh Start Function. 
States that have opted out of federal exemptions should 
undertake meaningful reexaminations of their existing exemp-
tions to ensure that their schemes serve the Fresh Start Function of 
bankruptcy. This assertion begs, of course, the question of what 
qualities of exemptions further a debtor’s “fresh start.” 
A. The Model 
As discussed earlier, some may find it difficult to reconcile 
state bankruptcy-specific exemptions with federal bankruptcy law 
under the Supremacy Clause. The proposed reform model (the 
Model) settles this issue in two respects. First, it provides some 
factors that opt-out states can and should follow in serving the 
Fresh Start Function. The inquiry is recast not as a determination 
of generousness, but functionality. The factors inject a measure of 
objectivity that can be followed in the legislative process. 
The second issue relates directly to preemption. A state that 
has reexamined its exemptions in light of the Model will have 
findings and a record that its exemption scheme, reformed or not, 
 
 218. In re Shafer, 689 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 219. Id. 
02.SULLIVAN_FIN_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/7/18  10:02 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2018 
386 
is designed to serve the Fresh Start Function. Such a record, 
ideally buttressed by smarter and more effective exemptions 
resulting from this review process, would seriously undercut any 
preemption attack. A state that has opted out but also undertaken 
a meaningful effort to provide exemptions to assist debtors in the 
Fresh Start Function would have fulfilled this purpose. 
This purpose is in the nature of “cooperative federalism.”220 
Unlike the traditional doctrine of cooperative federalism, how-
ever, the uniform bankruptcy exemptions set by Congress are 
viewed not as providing a concrete substantive standard but 
rather an illustrative set of standards based on the more 
fundamental purpose—fresh start—to be advanced. I label this 
federalism structure “quasi-cooperative federalism,”221 as the 
actual standards can (and, perhaps, should) depend on variables 
 
 220. The Supremacy Clause empowers Congress to enact regulations in support of 
Congress’s enumerated powers that “completely displace state regulation[s] and 
implement a purely federal regulatory scheme.” Rispin, supra note 210, at 1642. Despite this 
power to enact preemptive federal laws, Congress may choose to partner with state 
governments in certain areas preempted by federal regulations when Congress deems such 
a partnership to be beneficial. Id. In fact, the Supreme Court has expressly recognized 
Congress’s power to “offer States the choice of regulating [an] activity according to federal 
standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation.” See New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992); see also Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 
U.S. 742, 764 (1982); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 289 
(1981). The Supreme Court has called such an arrangement “a program of cooperative 
federalism.” Hodel, 452 U.S. at 289. In such a program, rather than preempting the authority 
of state governments, Congress may instead choose to invite state agencies to administer 
federal law. Weiser, supra note 210, at 1695. Cooperative federalism programs provide 
uniform federal standards set forth in either a statute or federal agency regulation (or both), 
but such statutes or regulations also allow the state governments flexibility in imple-
menting the federal law. Id. at 1696. For example, the states may choose to “supplement 
[the federal law] with more stringent standards,” or possibly seek exemptions from the 
requirements set forth in the statute or regulation altogether. Id. These types of schemes 
allow Congress to employ diversity in the federal framework by permitting states to 
experiment with different approaches. Id. at 1695–96. 
 221. Admittedly, a limitation of this idea is that it has not yet been developed in other 
federal/state contexts. A few obvious, yet unanswered, questions arise: Does quasi-
cooperative federalism impose an actual duty on the states to take any action? If so, what is 
the scope of the duty, and how would it be enforced? These questions are ripe for a 
subsequent article. The idea of quasi-cooperative federalism is proffered in the bankruptcy 
exemptions context for two narrow and specific purposes: (i) it is descriptive, since 
Congress has offered “uniform” standards along with a mechanism for state vetoes in the 
form of the opt-out; and (ii) it relates to the preemption analysis in the bankruptcy exemp-
tions context by providing this two-step defense to preemption claims—a meaningful 
review in light of the purpose of the federal standard, followed by a state law designed to 
serve that purpose. 
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that differ widely among states, such as cost of living, labor 
market conditions, housing availability and costs, availability of 
state-based welfare benefits, and the like. 
The most fundamental guiding principle of reform is that 
exemptions in bankruptcy should be designed to allow a debtor 
to retain the categories and amounts of property necessary to 
pursue future income. This principle derives from research 
showing that obtaining post-bankruptcy income is the key to 
debtor rehabilitation. 
1. Justification 
While bankruptcy scholars have long agreed that post-
bankruptcy income is the key variable to debtor rehabilitation, 
this theory was recently tested in a study conducted by Professor 
Katherine Porter and Dr. Deborah Thorne.222 Using original, 
longitudinal data, the researchers examined the “fresh start” 
assumption against the experiences of a group of Chapter 7 
debtors one year after bankruptcy. For purposes of the study, the 
“fresh start” predicate was established by each debtor receiving a 
discharge.223 The researchers discovered that one in three debtors 
was in the same or worse financial condition one year after 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy.224 
For the families with continuing or exacerbated financial stress 
one year after receiving a discharge, the study concluded that the 
inability to sustain regular income was the primary cause of this 
continued distress.225 The data established that triggers of income 
disruption included job problems, medical problems, and age.226 
“The major factor behind these families’ continuing financial 
struggles is stagnant or declining income in the period following 
their bankruptcies. As [the study] demonstrate[s], any factor that 
 
 222. Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy’s Fresh Start, 92 
CORNELL L. REV. 67 (2006). 
 223. Porter and Thorne did not examine the effect of exemptions on the study subjects. 
 224. Porter & Thorne, supra note 222 at 67. 
 225. Id. at 70. 
 226. Id. at 99–114. 
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leads to reduced postbankruptcy income will severely handicap a family’s 
prospects for a meaningful fresh start.”227 
The exemptions reform ideas address, most directly, the first 
of the income disruptions: job problems. The premise is that a 
debtor whose essential property—such as her motor vehicle, 
computer, or tools of the trade—is repossessed by the trustee will 
more likely experience job problems.228 In this construct, job 
problems include both losing a job and being unable to obtain 
employment or advancement. 
This premise is supported by data showing the types of assets 
typical bankruptcy debtors own. For instance, bankruptcy debtors 
are more likely than non-debtors to own a motor vehicle; those 
who have filed bankruptcy are also much less likely to own a 
home than non-debtors. Citing a 2004 survey that followed a 
major longitudinal study from 1979, one study noted that 92.4% of 
debtors who had filed bankruptcy owned motor vehicles versus 
an ownership rate of 89.5% for those who had never filed.229 Non-
debtors owned homes at a rate of 73.3%, versus a homeownership 
rate of 59.3% for those who had filed bankruptcy.230 This data 
suggests that debtors are more reliant on motor vehicles than 
those who have not filed bankruptcy. 
2. Structuring reforms 
One assumption is that the federal exemptions were ade-
quately designed and thoughtfully structured to serve the Fresh 
 
 227. Id. at 117 (emphasis added). 
 228. One note about a major limitation of the role of exemptions in the fresh start: 
Only debtors with protectable interests in would-be exempt property will benefit. The 
reality is that many debtors filing bankruptcy do not have equity in the types of property 
exemptions are designed to protect. Exemptions do not provide benefits to many debtors 
occupying the strata of the structurally poor, many of whom never accumulate assets. For 
this reason, the target and beneficiaries of exemptions reform should be the “working 
poor,” defined imperfectly as employed or employable debtors whose incomes are above 
federal poverty guidelines but below median income levels. Many debtors in this seam 
have realistic opportunities to secure future employment and, thereby, future income. As 
post-bankruptcy income is the sine qua non of the fresh start, exemption policy should be 
designed to enable—or, at a minimum, avoid disrupting—a debtor’s post-bankruptcy 
efforts to obtain or advance in employment. 
 229. Jay L. Zagorsky & Lois R. Lupica, A Study of Consumers’ Post-Discharge Finances: 
Struggle, Stasis, or Fresh-Start?, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 283, 298 (2008). 
 230. Id. 
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Start Function. This Article does not posit that the federal 
exemptions are ideal or perfect. Instead, due regard is given to the 
lengthy and deliberative process undertaken by Congress in 
adopting the specific categories and dollar amounts of the federal 
exemptions. The fresh start was identified as the primary purpose 
of having exemptions in bankruptcy, and the resulting federal 
exemptions were enacted to meet this objective. What exemption 
levels in bankruptcy are optimal? Or, stated differently, what 
qualities of exemptions provide utility for a financially distressed 
debtor seeking post-discharge rehabilitation? 
Three factors contributing to the Fresh Start Function can be 
teased out of the existing federal exemptions scheme: housing 
agnosticism, nominal sufficiency, and flexible allocation. 
This Article’s model of state exemption reforms envisions 
opt-out states undertaking deliberative reviews of existing 
exemptions in light of these factors.231 Leveraging a primary 
strength of federalism, state legislatures can experiment with 
different formulas, amounts, and rates for bankruptcy-specific 
exemptions. The factors are not formulaic, but rather principled. 
Different conditions, such as cost-of-living differences among 
the states, will necessarily prevent the emergence of a monolithic 
set of exemptions resulting from this model. Harmonization of 
these factors will be driven by economic and practical factors in 
the states, including considerations related to the labor market, 
transportation infrastructure, tax policy, costs of housing, and 
the like. 
a. Housing agnosticism. Most state general exemption schemes 
discriminate against non-homeowners. This discrimination should 
be eliminated, or at least significantly restricted, in bankruptcy. 
By providing homestead exemptions to homeowners, with no 
corresponding exemption to non-homeowners, most state general 
exemptions grant elevated status to certain forms of housing— 
ownership is preferred over renting. While all debtors have an 
interest in having a place to live post-bankruptcy, there is no 
empirical evidence that owning a home aids in a debtor’s quest to 
 
 231. Although most needed in many opt-out states, well-structured reforms could 
conceivably improve fresh starts even in states that permit the use of federal exemptions. 
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secure or advance future income. To be sure, there are important 
societal and governmental policy interests in incentivizing home-
ownership. As the recent financial crisis reminded us, however, 
owning a home is no panacea for building wealth or establishing 
financial security. To the contrary, recent trends suggest that 
many homeowners view their homes as ATMs (in the form of 
home equity lines of credits and refinancings) when home values 
improve and albatrosses when home values fall. The headlines 
concerning foreclosures and “short sales” are manifest. While 
exemption policy should not necessarily serve a paternalistic 
function of telling debtors not to buy homes, exemptions, at best, 
ought to be more agnostic toward debtors’ choices of living 
arrangements and whether to own residential property. 
The federal exemptions take a large step toward eliminating 
pro-homeowner discrimination in the form of the “wild card” 
exemption. To implement an exemption scheme reflecting hous-
ing agnosticism, states should follow the lead of Congress. In the 
federal bankruptcy exemptions, a “wild card” feature permits 
debtors232 to apply unused homestead exemption dollars to 
exempt assets other than a home, such as tools of the trade, a 
motor vehicle, and the like. In fact, unlike other particularized 
categories of exempt property, a debtor may use the “wild card” 
exemption to exempt his or her “interest in any property.”233 
The effect of the wild card is to largely level the playing field 
between homeowner debtors (with protectable equity) and other 
debtors. Specifically, the federal exemptions include a homestead 
exemption in the amount of $23,675. 234 The wild card permits a 
debtor to apply up to $11,850 of unused homestead exemption235 
to protect other property.236 This feature allows a debtor who 
 
 232. In states that have not opted out of the federal exemptions. 
 233. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5) (2016) (emphasis added). 
 234. Id. § 522(d)(1). 
 235. While the effect of the wild card exemption is to even the playing field between 
homeowner and non-homeowner debtors, and thereby inject a degree of housing agnosti-
cism, even homeowner debtors are eligible to use the “wild card.” Eligibility for the wild 
card does not depend on ownership, but rather the extent to which the homestead exemp-
tion is actually used. Accordingly, a debtor with little to no equity in his home may still be 
able to use the wild card. 
 236. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5). 
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chooses to rent,237 rather than own, housing to enjoy an aggregate 
exemption level more in line with amounts for homeowners. 
Almost all existing state exemption schemes continue to reflect 
this pro-home-ownership bias. This should not be surprising, as 
general state exemptions are justified, in part, by the idea that 
allowing a financially distressed debtor to keep her home serves 
important governmental and societal policies of maintaining the 
family. Indeed, this policy is an imperative component of the 
Independent Subsistence Function of state exemptions.238 
There is no empirical evidence, however, that incentivizing 
home ownership furthers the Fresh Start Function. Because of the 
cyclical nature of home values, falling market conditions may, in 
fact, contribute to financial distress239 by removing a potential 
source of cash and by preventing otherwise mobile debtors from 
being able to move to find better employment opportunities. 
Since many bankrupt debtors do not own homes, or own 
homes with little to no equity, including a wild-card feature in 
opt-out states would serve three purposes. First, it would remove 
the incentive to own an asset not directly related to a debtor’s 
ability to pursue future income. By leveling the playing field 
between homeowner and non-homeowner debtors, a wild-card 
exemption would acknowledge implicitly that the total costs of 
housing going forward may be more determinative in the fresh 
start equation than the form of those costs (e.g., rent versus a 
mortgage payment). Second, a wild-card exemption would largely 
remove discrimination against non-homeowners, where that 
discrimination is justified by the Independent Subsistence Func-
tion but not the Fresh Start Function. 
Last, and perhaps most importantly, a wild-card feature would 
free up a significant amount of exemption dollars for debtors to 
allocate in the way optimal for each. One debtor may prefer a 
larger allowance for keeping a motor vehicle, while another may 
use those exemption dollars to protect more tools of the trade 
 
 237. Or debtors who own homes that either have little equity or are under water. 
 238. See supra Part I. 
 239. The opposite may hold true in periods of rising home prices, with increased 
home values placing debtors in a superior financial position on a balance sheet basis. 
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related to their craft or industry. This flexibility would place 
debtors in a position to decide what property is most crucial. 
In addition to enacting a wild-card provision to address 
housing agnosticism, state reforms should address the questions 
of what amounts of exemption dollars should be designated 
and how they should be designated among different classifi-
cations of protected property. These questions introduce, respec-
tively, the interrelated factors of nominal sufficiency and 
allocative flexibility. 
b. Nominal sufficiency. The concept of nominal sufficiency rests 
on the notion that providing sufficient dollar amounts of 
exemptions is necessary to serve the Fresh Start Function. At 
extremes, an exemption scheme that provides one dollar of 
protection would put a distressed debtor with protectable assets 
in a less favorable position to rehabilitate than the same debtor 
would enjoy under a scheme that provided unlimited dollar 
amounts for exemptions. For a debtor with a modest paid-for car, 
for instance, having a sufficient dollar amount of exemptions 
could be the difference between keeping her car after bankruptcy 
or having the car repossessed and liquidated by the trustee in 
bankruptcy. A debtor under the former scenario would be in a 
superior position. 
The overall aim of the nominal sufficiency factor is to ensure 
protection, at a very minimum, for a typical debtor with protect-
able assets240 to retain possession of as many of those assets as 
possible. On the margin, providing more generous dollar amounts 
of exemptions might also incentivize debtors to accumulate 
property. By allowing a debtor to retain a higher aggregate value 
of property following bankruptcy, the sufficiency factor will aid in 
serving the Fresh Start Function. 
Congress has provided some meaningful guideposts to dollar 
amounts in the federal exemptions. An important threshold issue 
is that some types of property should, for policy reasons, be 
protected in unlimited dollar amounts. The federal exemptions 
 
 240. Essentially, assets purchased with cash or on unsecured credit and not otherwise 
encumbered by a perfected security interest. As part of the 2005 Amendments, the Code 
expanded rules to prevent a debtor from purchasing so-called “luxury items” on unsecured 
credit on the eve of filing bankruptcy. 
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include several “no dollar limit” categories, including unmatured 
life insurance contracts, professionally prescribed health aids, 
social security, unemployment, and veteran’s benefits, among 
others.241 While some of these items are currently protected under 
federal non-bankruptcy laws, as well as laws in some states, any 
meaningful exemption reforms by states should include a review 
of these categories and items to make sure that they enjoy 
unlimited dollar amount protections. 
Outside the list of property that enjoys elevated status via 
unlimited exemptions, the dollar amounts for exemptions in 
bankruptcy should provide a guaranteed minimum of protection. 
For consumer property, the federal dollar amounts provide useful 
benchmarks expressed in nominal dollar amounts. Under the 
federal exemptions, each debtor is provided an exemption of 
$12,250 for basic consumer property, including household goods, 
household furnishings, and wearing apparel. Additional amounts 
are provided for specific property categories, including jewelry 
($1,550) and motor vehicles ($3,675). “Tools of the trade” enjoy a 
separate category under the federal exemptions, and the current 
amount for this type of property is $2,300.242 
c. Allocative flexibility. Determining what types of property 
should be protected by exemptions should be a central issue in 
structuring bankruptcy-specific exemptions. A simple example is 
illustrative. Assume after undertaking a meaningful review of 
existing exemptions, opt-out State X determines that $40,000 is an 
appropriate amount243 to satisfy nominal sufficiency. Assume 
further that State X determines that an appropriate homestead 
exemption is $15,000 and that a wild-card exemption would 
permit any unused homestead exemption to be allocated dollar-for-
dollar over other property categories. This illustration raises two 
interrelated issues: (i) other than homestead, what other categories 
of consumer property deserve exempt status in bankruptcy and 
(ii) how are dollar amounts assigned to each category. 
 
 241. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(7)–(12). 
 242. Id. 
 243. As a multifactor model, this illustration assumes that State X determines that this 
amount is nominally sufficient in the context of all three factors. 
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A logical and useful starting point is a comparison between 
federal bankruptcy exemptions and State X’s existing general 
exemptions. The most straightforward method for determining 
the sufficiency of property categorization is to use the federal 
exemptions as a base structural template. For instance, if State X 
does not provide for an exemption category for “tools of the 
trade,” then it should. The federal list of property categories is 
neither long nor particularly complicated. 
There is ample evidence that Congress had the Fresh Start 
Function in mind when debating and structuring the federal 
exemptions. The individual property categories that resulted from 
the legislative process can and should serve as a useful guide that 
allows State X to avoid reinventing the “property categories” 
wheel.244 Since the federal categories are viewed as a template, 
State X would have flexibility to add or massage categories. For 
instance, some rural states may want to maintain an exemption 
category for agricultural implements. Other states may want to 
preserve the so-called “family heirloom” category that exists in 
many bankruptcy-neutral schemes. 
A related and equally important issue is how to allocate 
exemption dollars among property categories. As with property 
categories, the question of dollar allocation among categories is 
ripe for state-based customization. Take the example of an 
exemption for a motor vehicle. Should all opt-out states have a 
motor vehicle exemption available to debtors in bankruptcy? 
Given that the federal exemptions are proffered as a template, and 
those exemptions include a motor vehicle category, the answer is 
“yes.” But to what extent? And at what cost to other categories? A 
small yet urbanized state with a highly developed public 
transportation system might allocate fewer dollars to a motor 
vehicle exemption than a geographically large and rural state. For 
large percentages of the population base in some states, owning a 
car might be a virtual necessity for most jobs. In states where most 
residents live in urban areas with reliable public transportation, 
motor vehicles may serve as more of a convenience than a necessity. 
 
 244. There is risk that Congress could add to or remove property categories from the 
federal exemptions list. This discussion assumes that this possibility is remote. 
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B. Parting Thoughts on the Political Calculus of Reforms 
Some in Congress envisioned states reexamining their exemp-
tion schemes as part of deliberating whether to opt out of the 
federal exemptions. Though many states passed laws electing to 
opt out of the federal exemptions, too few failed to advance efforts 
at exemption reform. Several forces have suppressed efforts for 
broad exemption reforms in the states. Reform efforts pit familiar 
rivals against each other: On one hand, consumer advocacy 
groups push for states to liberalize exemptions in favor of debtors; 
on the other, creditor constituencies resist these efforts. 
Enacting bankruptcy-specific exemptions, as opposed to 
reforming generally applicable exemptions, cuts through some of 
the political resistance to reform in a few important ways. 
First, the scope and “cost” of bankruptcy exemptions are small 
relative to liberalizing general exemptions. General exemptions 
prevent unsecured creditors from seizing a debtor’s property 
under state law collections suits. The number of individuals facing 
state law collection suits dwarfs the number of individuals filing 
bankruptcy. Thus, the group of beneficiaries of modernized 
bankruptcy exemptions is relatively small. 
Nationally, the number of debtors potentially affected by 
general exemption reforms is unsettlingly high. Data on the 
numbers of Americans facing collection suits provide the picture. 
For instance, approximately “[o]ne in 10 working Americans 
between the ages of 35 and 44 are getting their wages gar-
nished.”245 Almost all of these garnishments are filed by 
unsecured creditors, the group that would bear the “costs” of 
liberalizing general state exemptions. The enormous political 
resistance to general exemption reform is both understandable 
and predictable. 
In addition to specific data on garnishments, more general 
data on collections reveals an epidemic in past-due accounts in 
America. For instance, a report released in July 2014 by the Urban 
Institute found that 35% of adults in America with a credit file 
 
 245. Chris Arnold & Paul Kiel, Millions of Americans’ Wages Seized over Credit Card and 
Medical Debt, NPR (Sept. 15, 2014, 4:52 AM), http://www.npr.org/2014/09/15/347957729 
/when-consumer-debts-go-unpaid-paychecks-can-take-a-big-hit. 
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(about 77 million Americans) have a report of debt in collec-
tions.246 On average, these adults owe approximately $5,178.247 For 
a debt to be in collections, a non-mortgage bill—such as a credit 
card, medical, or utility bill—must be more than 180 days past 
due.248 Furthermore, approximately 5.3% of those Americans with 
a credit file have a report of a past due debt (one that is not yet in 
collections), which means that they are between 30 and 180 days 
late on a non-mortgage payment.249 
Liberalizing general exemptions could potentially impair the 
leverage and position of unsecured creditors in the cases of the 
40.3% of American adults who are in default! 
By contrast, bankruptcy-specific exemption reforms would 
affect a much smaller group of debtors—those filing bankruptcy— 
in a context in which existing exemption schemes are producing 
very small returns to unsecured creditors. In bankruptcy parlance, 
a Chapter 7 case is a “no asset” case when no funds are available 
for distribution to unsecured creditors. Once an individual files 
bankruptcy, the trustee sells a debtor’s non-exempt, non-
encumbered property to produce funds for distribution to unse-
cured creditors. With existing exemptions that apply in 
bankruptcy, the “no asset” case, producing zero return to unse-
cured creditors, is very much the norm.250 In cases involving very 
small dollar amounts of exempt property, trustees may forego 
repossessing property because there is not enough value to justify 
the costs of sale. In June 2014, an American Bankruptcy Institute 
study reported that only approximately 8% of Chapter 7 cases 
nationwide are closed as asset cases.251 
Accordingly, unsecured creditors are receiving small returns 
in existing Chapter 7 cases under existing exemption schemes. In 
many Chapter 7 cases, the distribution is literally zero. Given 
 
 246. CAROLINE RATCLIFFE ET AL., URB. INST., DELINQUENT DEBT IN AMERICA 4 (July 30, 
2014), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/413191-Delinquent-Debt-in-America.pdf. 
 247. Id. at 7. 
 248. Id. at 8. 
 249. Id. at 2. 
 250. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES TRUSTEE PROGRAM: PRELIMINARY 
REPORT ON CHAPTER 7 ASSET CASES 1994 TO 2000 (2001). 
 251. Ed Flynn, Chapter 7 Asset Cases and Trustee Compensation, AM. BANKR. INST. J., 
June 2014, at 48, 48. 
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these facts, state efforts to provide bankrupt individuals enhanced 
exemption rights should have, under the worst-case scenario for 
unsecured creditors, an almost unfelt effect on the current near-
zero return. While broad exemption reforms would provide 
nearly one-half of debtors outside of bankruptcy increased 
leverage, the much smaller number of bankruptcy filings paired 
with the reality of near-zero returns should alleviate much of the 
rational political resistance to state reform efforts. 
Finally, the Model acknowledges the role of federalism in 
bankruptcy exemption policy. States concerned with preserving 
states’ rights should find reforms more palatable. Guided only by 
the factors in the Model, each state can make its own 
determination of the optimal dollar amounts and categories of 
exemptions in bankruptcy. Rural states might bring a heavier 
focus on exempting motor vehicles, for instance. The concurrent 
exemption regime is preserved and enhanced through the 
federalist system. 
CONCLUSION 
Properly tailored reforms by states can and should solve the 
longstanding quandary of property exemptions created by the 
bankruptcy opt-out provision. Using the proposed framework, 
state reforms would survive constitutional scrutiny. The Code and 
fresh start doctrine empower states to implement bankruptcy-
specific exemptions that address state-specific circumstances in 
light of the federal rehabilitative function of bankruptcy. Armed 
with clarity and meaningful guideposts for reform, states can now 
take steps to ensure that residents electing bankruptcy have access 
to broader and more effective “fresh starts.” 	  
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APPENDIX A 
Select State Bankruptcy-Specific Provisions 
 
 
 
State BSE Statute Date(s) 
Date of 
Repeal 
and 
Citation Notable cases 
California CAL. CIV. PROC. 
CODE § 703.140 
(West 2013) 
First Enacted: 
July 31, 1995 
 
— Held unconstitutional 
by In re Regevig, 389 
B.R. 736 (Bankr. D. 
Ariz. 2008). 
Colorado COLO. REV. STAT.  
§ 13-54-104(1.1) 
First Enacted: 
May 31, 1979 
June 1, 1991 Held unconstitutional 
by In re Mata, 115 B.R. 
288 (Bankr. D. Colo. 
1990). But see In re Kulp, 
949 F.2d 1106, 1109 n.3 
(10th Cir. 1991). 
Indiana IND. CODE  
§ 34-2-28(1)(a)(5) 
July 1, 1989 July 1, 1998 Held unconstitutional 
by In re Cross, 255 B.R. 
25 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 
2000). 
Kansas KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 60-2315 (2013) 
April 14, 2011 — Held constitutional by 
In re Westby, 486 B.R. 
509 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 
2013). 
Michigan MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. 
§ 600.5451 
(West 2013) 
Current: 
Dec. 31, 2012 
First Enacted: 
Jan. 3, 2005 
— Held constitutional by 
In re Schafer, 689 F.3d 
601 (6th Cir. 2012). 
Montana MONT. CODE 
ANN. 
§ 31-2-106 (2013) 
Current: 
Feb. 10, 2009 
First Enacted: 
April 23, 1991 
— Held constitutional by 
In re Shumaker, 124 B.R. 
820 (Bankr. D. Mont. 
1991). 
West 
Virginia 
W. VA. CODE  
§ 38-10-4 (2013) 
March 8, 2003 — Held constitutional by 
Sheehan v. Peveich, 574 
F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 2009). 
